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The objective of the present study was to assess the economic and social costs 
of road accidents in Portugal.
It was conducted by the Center for Economic Analysis of Social Regulation (CARS) 
at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, commissioned by the National Authority 
for Road Safety (Autoridade Nacional de Segurança Rodoviária), hereinafter 
ANSR, and is aimed at planning and coordinating the support of the Government’s 
policy on road safety at the national level.
Comprehending these costs constitutes the first phase towards further analysis 
of the causes of traffic accidents, allowing for the implementation of policies that 
lead to their minimization, contributing thereof to the maximization of social 
welfare.
The empirical ascertainment of the social costs of accidents is an indicator of 
the magnitude of the social problem resulting therefrom, since it is virtually 
impossible, through any of the methods used herein, to accurately determine 
such a social cost.
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Preface
Road accidents represent a huge social problem. Many of these accidents 
are preventable and by preventing them, society increases the supply of 
scarce resources that can be used to increase income and improve welfare. 
The study presented in this book is the first comprehensive study of the 
costs of road accidents in Portugal. The study is unique by presenting 
estimates of road accident costs for a period of fifteen years. During this 
period, road safety has been greatly improved in Portugal and the costs of 
road accidents have therefore been reduced.
There are many ways of estimating road accident costs and no consensus 
exists regarding the best method. While the willingness-to-pay approach 
has many supporters, and from a theoretical point of view is the best ap-
proach, assessing willingness-to-pay empirically has turned out to be very 
difficult. Studies have been reported in many countries, but the results vary 
enormously. In view of this, there is a need for more research concerning 
how best to elicit willingness-to-pay for improved road safety.
The root of the difficulties may, however, run deeper than many research-
ers are willing to admit. If people do not have clear preferences regarding 
the provision of road safety, and are easily influenced by the way valuation 
tasks have been framed, any estimate of the willingness-to- pay for less 
road accidents is bound to be very imprecise.
This book has estimated the costs of road accidents by means of the human 
capital approach. The welfare effect, which many other studies try to 
estimate in terms of willingness-to-pay, is included by relying on court 
cases in which compensation has been paid for non-monetary damages.
The costs presented in this book should be viewed as minimum estimates.
The actual costs could be considerably higher, but are unlikely to be lower 
than estimated in this study. In addition to estimating the costs of accidents, 
the study includes an interesting analysis of factors that have influenced 
road safety in Portugal from 1988 to 2010. It is clear that some road safety 
initiatives taken in this period have been successful, others have not. It is 
important to systematically evaluate the effects of road safety measures in 
order to promote an optimal use of them. By studying historical experience 
both with respect to factors that have influenced road safety and changes 
in the cost of road accidents, an improved basis has been developed for a 
more effective road safety policy. It is to be hoped that policy makers will 
heed the lessons provided by this study.
Rune Elvik
Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway
Foreword
The National Road Safety Strategy, a structural and fundamental document 
of road safety policy in our country, has recognized the need to estimate 
the economic and social cost of road accidents in Portugal. It is our intent 
that this cost be considered in the decision-making process, namely in the 
transportation sector, land-use and territorial planning, internal affairs, 
education, health, taxation, among others. In doing so, we shall have more 
well-informed, fair and coordinated long-term decisions aimed at achiev-
ing a civilized road transport system founded on freedom of mobility and 
on an unconditional safeguard of human life of all those who make use of 
the road system. 
Given the complexity and expertise needed to achieve such objectives we 
made no hesitation in contacting Prof. Arlindo Donário at the Universidade 
Autónoma de Lisboa, who has developed research in this field and has 
published several referential works, of which worth mentioning is his book 
entitled, “Economic Analysis of Social Regulation, Causes, Consequences and 
Policy of Road Accidents”. 
We congratulate him on his work which was conducted in co-authorship 
with Ricardo Borges dos Santos, for we are in mist of a highly regarded 
study that marks the beginning of a systematic data collecting process 
that will allow us to monitor and maintain updated the statistical data 
currently obtained. 
Yet, the development of this study was not an isolated and secluded office 
process; on the contrary, it demanded innumerous meetings and count-
less hours of work between the co-authors and professionals at ANSR, 
regarding the discussion of methodology, collection of data from various 
government bodies and the discussion of results. It was a combined effort 
of which we are proud of since it has contributed to the acquisition and 
consolidation of knowledge in this field. 
Finally, I can do no more but to conclude that the decision on choosing the 
“Human Capital” method to assess the costs of road accidents in Portugal 
proved to be the wisest. Indeed, in light of what we know today, it would 
have been foolish to have chosen an alternative methodology without 
having this study as a reference.
In regards to Prof. Arlindo Donário, Ricardo Borges dos Santos and his team 
I wish to thank them for their magnificent work, their open mind and their 
ability to search for the best solutions and I wish that other works with 
equal importance for road safety policies to be developed in the future. 
Oeiras, july 2012
Paulo Marques Augusto
Presidente da Autoridade Nacional de Segurança Rodoviária
President of National Authority for Road Safety
Synopsis
The objective of the present study was to assess the economic and social 
costs of road accidents in Portugal.
It was conducted by the Center for Economic Analysis of Social Regulation 
(CARS) at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, commissioned by the 
National Authority for Road Safety (Autoridade Nacional de Segurança 
Rodoviária), hereinafter ANSR, and is aimed at planning and coordinating 
the support of the Government’s policy on road safety at the national level.
Comprehending these costs constitutes the first phase towards further 
analysis of the causes of traffic accidents, allowing for the implementation 
of policies that lead to their minimization, contributing thereof to the 
maximization of social welfare.
The empirical ascertainment of the social costs of accidents is an indicator 
of the magnitude of the social problem resulting therefrom, since it is 
virtually impossible, through any of the methods used herein, to accurately 
determine such a social cost.

Introduction
Throughout the ages mobility has been and will always be man’s necessity. 
It allows people to interact with each other and to transact goods and 
services, increasing the level and quality of human life, an aspiration that 
reflects the very essence of man in his continuous struggle for permanent 
fulfillment of his objectives.
In the course of human history, inherent costs and resultant benefits have 
been associated to human mobility; however, it was during the twentieth 
century that road mobility – in addition to air transportation – advanced 
exponentially with the use of motor vehicles, decreasing the time spent 
on travel and increasing economic transactions worldwide.
Road mobility along with its diachronic increase has allowed Humanity 
to speed up its rate of development, rendering high benefits. Nonetheless, 
empirical evidence and theoretical studies have shown that costs and 
benefits arise from all choices, wherefore one of the main objectives is to 
minimize these costs, which is to say, to obtain benefits with the minimum 
of sacrifices so as to achieve efficiency, i.e., to maximize social welfare (or 
utility).
Road transport allows for greater economic efficiency, reducing the time 
of travel while simultaneously having a negative impact on the environ-
ment and on safety, resulting therefore, in conflicting objectives that 
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only through a costs-benefit analysis one can find equilibrium, which is 
demonstrated by the minimization of the social costs of accidents.
Even in theoretical terms, it can be said that when it comes to road trans-
port it’s unlikely (or even impossible) to reduce crashes to zero, since it 
is not humanly possible to eliminate risk, whether it is accident risk or 
any other risk-generating activity. Indeed, all aspects of human life and 
all choices involve risk and uncertainty, more or less, leaving it up to 
individuals and society as whole not to eliminate risk entirely – because it 
is futile – but rather to minimize it. Within the framework of road safety, it 
rests upon Government through its regulatory intervention, to enact and 
implement policies that contribute towards minimizing the social cost of 
road accidents, with the aim of maximizing social welfare.
When making decisions, individuals are driven to maximize self-interest, 
reducing the costs stemming from their choices while taking into account 
certain moral and ethical values  (which compose his/her “personal equa-
tion”). Most often those choices adversely affect the interests of other 
groups of individuals.
In a cost-benefit analysis we most often observe that the choices made, 
bring about greater social costs than social benefits (although benefits 
outweigh the costs for certain individuals or groups) generating social 
inefficiency and consequently reducing collective welfare.
Road mobility entails high risk, which is per se one of the constituents of 
the social costs of accidents together with various sorts of monetary costs 
and non-monetary costs or moral costs, which aren’t reflected in neither 
the national income nor product.
With regard to road mobility, in order to maximize social welfare, life in 
society implies that individuals agree to abide by a series of rules that 
enables social interaction at the most diverse levels. It also entails the valu-
ation of a wide range of factors, so that safety – which can be considered a 
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primary and merit good – can be maximized with an ensuing minimization 
of social costs of accidents in an efficient manner.
Within the theoretical framework developed in this study, we believe that 
when a person decides to take a trip – the means by which, at what time 
and for how long he travels – the expected costs and benefits are weighed, 
whereby the individual seeks to maximize the difference between ex-
pected private gain and cost.
In his choice, the individual marginally assesses the alternatives1. Usually, 
his decision fails to consider the external costs and benefits that result from 
such behavior. These external costs and benefits are respectively identified 
as negative and positive externalities.
Given that road transport generates widespread costs and benefits that 
affect not only the individual who decides on whether to adopt certain be-
havior when using a vehicle but also other individuals in society – granted 
that they seek to minimize costs and maximize utility brought about by 
their demeanor and actions – the (overall) social cost generally tends to be 
higher than the cost borne by individuals (referred to as private cost) who 
adopt certain behavior or actions.
Hence, the road safety market fails with respect to efficiency, justifying 
government intervention through various sorts of policies making indi-
viduals internalize their external costs. Only through this internalization 
will efficient behavior be obtained.
Regulation of road mobility is justified because the market fails to ef-
ficiently solve the problem of road safety. Individuals seek to maximize 
self-interest and may engage in behavior that affects road safety, for 
instance: driving without insurance or a driver’s license, using a vehicle 
without passenger safety equipment, driving under the influence of alcohol 
or other substances and so on. Such reckless behavior increases the risk of 
1 The term “marginal” refers to the variance of the total cost or total benefit resulting 
from a new trip.
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accidents along with the risk of fatality and injury. Risk, as stated earlier, 
is in itself one of the constituents of accident cost.
Government intervention through the enactment of rules is aimed at 
reducing reckless behavior with negative effects on society. Regulatory 
intervention is one of the methods that government uses to alter such 
conduct in order to increase efficiency along with direct intervention on 
roads. Road safety can be deemed a merit good, whose utility may not be 
adequately assessed by road users because they lack sufficient informa-
tion, in particular, risk arising from road transport.
Since an accident is a rare event in the individual’s driving career and, by 
the very definition of the word, an accident occurs through an unexpected 
combination of circumstances, people are unable to correctly assess the 
statistical probability of having an accident, since in general and on aver-
age, subjective probabilities differ from objective probabilities, and the 
greater the difference, the greater the error in assessing objective risk. 
For this reason, they will not take into account all the risks that may stem 
from their behavior, therefore leading to inefficiency with damages to 
themselves and to others in society.
State intervention is also justified by the compensatory function that 
is intended by the tort system through compulsory third-party liability 
insurance (with risk-differentiated premiums) mainly because of market 
failures relative to non-economic damages. Another reason is the existence 
of traffic accident externalities that can’t be internalized, as is usually the 
case of personal injury whose full compensation is difficult or unfeasible 
as in the case of wrongful death2.
Oftentimes, we witness violations of traffic rules – which allow for mobility 
at a minimal cost – as a result of existing market failures in the road mobil-
ity and safety market – generating motives for the State to intervene as a 
2 The victims who suffer the loss of a relative may only be partially and symbolically 
compensated. Vide Article 496 of the Portuguese Civil Code.
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regulator through the enactment of rules and as an enforcer in the case of 
traffic offenses.
Government intervention is also justified by the existence of other market 
failures, among which we highlight: a) various types of externalities 
including monetary and non-monetary damages caused to third parties 
and environmental pollution; b) information failures c) the existence of 
goods with characteristics of public goods (roads); d) incomplete markets 
(represented by the absence of a market for certain non-monetary goods) 
and risk caused by automotive driving.
Considering that road accidents are caused by the interaction of multiple 
factors that form a complex and dynamic system, adequate policies that 
minimize social costs should be integrated, that is, the various sets of 
determinants of accidents should be taken into account and in many 
instances their interaction and potentiation of risk.

I 
Regulation and Efficiency3
Road safety regulation4 and liability in tort represent two very different 
approaches for controlling activities that create risks of harm to others.
Tort liability is private in nature and works indirectly since it influences 
the behavior of individuals through expected costs (i.e. deterrent effect of 
damage actions). It is employed ex-post in relation to damages5.
Furthermore, the internalization of externalities is carried out by the initia-
tive of private parties and most of the elements that compose external costs 
are assessed in accordance to market criteria. For tort rules to apply there 
must be an actual occurrence of harm to the victim. Victims corroborate in 
identifying tortfeasors because they expect to obtain compensation, and 
thus, contribute towards the efficacy of these rules.
On the other hand, road safety regulation imposes certain restrictions and 
establishes standard conduct. Consider for example, rules governing driv-
3 Vide Donário, (2010a). p. 338.
4 The judicial system can be considered a public good that cannot be divided into units that 
can be sold in a market individually. It is referred to as an indivisible good that justifies 
government intervention to optimize the allocation of resources.
5 For more on this subject see: Shavel, S. Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety. 
Working Paper No. 1218. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1983. Blomquist, C. G. 
The Regulation of Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
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ing impairment, speed limits, seat belt use and the like. These standards 
are public in nature and usually modify driver behavior in an immediate 
way. They entail interdictions – interpreted as costs and loss of utility to 
individuals – and their purpose is to achieve road safety to minimize social 
costs. They set standard conduct and provide for sanctions that constitute 
a potential cost for offenders.
Most of these rules emanate from the legislative branch of government, 
whose task is to enact laws that govern road use. The administrative branch 
and the judicial branch of government intervene in the direct implementa-
tion of these rules through police authorities and the judicial system6.
The effects of regulatory standards are ex-ante in relation to damages, id 
est.; the offense is associated to a penalty regardless of the actual occur-
rence of harm. Regulation is grounded in the tenet that the risk involved in 
automotive driving should be kept within certain limits for it to be socially 
acceptable, thereby contributing to minimize the social costs of accidents.
The burden of having to bear a certain level of risk foists a cost on road 
users and has an impact on accident risk because individual actors act in 
their own interests – with the amount of information available to them at 
each moment – and are likely to adopt behavior that maximizes the dif-
ference between expected costs and benefits. To control traffic accidents, 
it is imperative that the effort be focused on modifying the behavior of 
drivers and other road users, considering both the incentives created by 
regulation, by the probability of enforcement, and by other determinants of 
accidents among which we underline those related to the vehicle and road 
environment (roads and motorways) and the sociocultural and psychologi-
cal aspects of the driver (set of moral values in a broad sense – including 
ethical, social and religious values).
6 Caetano (1977) – Princípios Fundamentais do Direito Administrativo. Rio de janeiro, Brazil: 
Forense, pp. 36-37.
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As postulated by A.j. Bonni7, the impact of regulation on the behavior of 
road users will depend on the distribution and intensity of individual pref-
erences for various types of risky behavior and in their attitudes towards 
risk. Driving care demands that road users have adequate risk-perception. 
Road users must bear all the costs and benefits of their actions in order to 
fulfill the efficiency requirement. If the individual expects partial inter-
nalization of his externalities, his behavior will tend to be inefficient and 
the level of unlawful activity will increase, leading to behaviors such as 
speeding, more frequent use of vehicles, higher BAC levels, ingestion of 
illegal substances that impair risk perception and reduce reflexes and other 
traffic violations that tend to increase accident risk.
The sanctions provided for in road traffic rules combined with the prob-
ability of enforcement (expected sanction) constitute incentives that 
induce individuals to develop behavior that is conducive towards optimum 
care, thereby reducing the number of accidents and their consequences.8 
Collectively with the tort system, regulations are an aggregate of behavioral 
modifiers that, aside from their individual efficacy, acquire the synergetic 
effects of their joint application.
If drivers and other road users have incomplete information as to the 
objective probability of accidents it shall distort their risk-perception, 
either through risk-underestimation or risk-overestimation, producing 
inefficiency since individual behavior is based on subjective probability9. 
Incomplete information is a market failure that justifies social regulation 
7 Bonni (1985) – The efficacy of law as paternalistic instrument. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention. In: Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, pp. 131-211.
8 As mentioned, most accidents are not recorded by the authorities, in particular, those 
that only cause property damage, due to which their information could lead to increased 
insurance premiums. Moreover, the intervention of the law enforcement could result in 
a penalty for the causer if he had committed a violation.
9 Kahneman; Tversky (1979) – Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econo-
metrica, Vol. 47, pp. 285 et seq.
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of the road safety and mobility market through the enactment of road 
traffic regulations.
Increasing the objective probability of law enforcement tends to straighten 
the gap between objective and subjective probabilities, leading to in-
creased efficiency of behavior. Herewith, a low objective probability of law 
enforcement will entail a wider gap in relation to subjective probability 
which determines driver demeanor, generating a higher level of inef-
ficiency and reduced efficacy of road traffic rules.
Road traffic regulations establish standard driving conduct regardless of 
personal circumstances or extenuating conditions of vehicles and road 
environment due to the lack of complete information by the regulatory 
authority concerning the level of specific risk generated by each driver 
and road user. In short, regulation by generalization occurs because it is 
harder for the regulator to tailor the law to the specifics of each situation. 
Like any other individual, we assume that police officers seek to maximize 
their interests by weighing expected costs and benefits10. In Portugal, the 
Highway Code provides that police officers do not earn a percentage of 
the fines issued. Still, some agents may have to bear some of the costs of 
law enforcement including court appearances and perhaps some non-
monetary costs. If expected costs outweigh expected benefits there will 
be incentives to avoid implementing the sanctions provided by law.
On the other hand, if the salaries of enforcers are relatively low and there 
is an absence of other positive incentives, and considering that if the 
structure of moral values is not eminent – with its set of internal sanctions 
(transposed as guilt) and external penalties (social reprimand) and its set of 
external and internal rewards – then incentives for corruption can arise, 
reducing the effectiveness of law enforcement.
10 Becker; Stigler (1974) – Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers. 
The Journal of Legal Studies, No. 3-1, pp. 1-18.
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In economic terms, target risk of automotive driving is part of the decision-
making process of people who act rationally within the confines of time, 
income and other goods. Suppose that safety is a normal or superior 
good subject to the law of diminishing marginal utility. Since road traffic 
regulations create incentives that alter the behavior of drivers and other 
road users – affecting the demand for safety – the risk that individuals 
decide to take at a given time shall be influenced. As pointed out by Alan 
Stone, regulation limits choice:
“Regulation has been defined as “a state imposed limitation on the 
discretion that may be exercised by individual’s organizations, which is 
supported by the threat of sanction.”11
Effective enforcement of regulations raises the issue of the compensation or 
substitution effect. The imposition of a particular regulation, whose goal is 
to increase road safety, incites a positive behavioral change in individuals 
so that they may achieve their objectives in another way. Ultimately, if 
such behavioral change takes place the individual will seek “alternative 
goods” and the effectiveness of regulation will tend to decrease.
Among the existing theories regarding risk compensation we highlight 
the risk-homeostasis hypothesis postulated by Gerald j.S. Wilde12. This 
author seeks to integrate the heterogeneity of factors known to cause 
traffic accidents into a single concept of target risk. Changes resulting 
from incentives created by ex-ante regulation (vehicle safety and road 
environment regulation) and ex-post liability rules may have reduced 
efficacy because of possible substitution effects. According to this theory 
accident risk shall be reduced in the long term only if there is a change in 
the level of target risk.
11 Stone (1982) – Regulations and Its Alternatives. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, p. 10. Cited by: Viscusi, W. Kip; Vermon, John M.; Harrington, Joseph 
E. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1998. p. 307.
12 Cf. Wilde (2001) – Target Risk2. Toronto-Ontario, Canada: PDE Publications.
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Sam Peltzman, meanwhile, has also developed a theory regarding risk 
compensation. The crux of Peltzman’s hypothesis is that driving safety is 
a normal good subject to the restrictions of income and time, and whose 
demand also depends on its price and the price of alternative goods. Thus, 
mandatory installation of safety devices in vehicles such as seat belts, 
airbags and other devices may cause substitution effects and offsetting 
behavior:
“The mandatory installation of safety devices does not by itself change 
the private demand for safety, but it may change some relevant prices, 
the response to which may mitigate some of the technological promises 
of these devices”.13
On one hand, the installation of passive safety devices in vehicles tends to 
reduce the risk of accidents and their effects but, on the other hand – con-
sidering the level of target risk – drivers tend to react to safety regulation 
by increasing risky behavior such as speeding and other risky maneuvers 
that offset some of the benefits of automobile safety equipment. On a final 
note, Peltzman roots his hypothesis on the concept of wealth maximization 
and relates time-saving to the origin of wealth.
13 Peltzman (1975) – The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 83, No. 41, pp. 680-681.
II 
European Comparison
For an overview of the magnitude of the problem in comparative terms, 
see the graph below pertaining to the number of road fatalities per mil-
lion inhabitants in five southern European countries, during the period 
1991-2008:
Graph 2.1
Trend in the number of road fatalities per million inhabitants in five countries:  
Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain and France (1991-2008)
Source: Based on Eurostat data.
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Among the five countries analyzed above, Portugal registered the highest 
road fatality rate per million inhabitants at the beginning of the period (323 
deaths per million inhabitants) reaching a rate of 83 deaths per million 
inhabitants towards the end of the period (2008), drawing near Italy with 
a rate of 79, Spain with 68 and France with 67.
However, Portugal registered the highest rate of decreasing variance 
among these five countries, with an accumulated variance rate of - 147% 
at the end of the period, followed by Spain with a rate of - 131%, France 
with -108%, Italy with - 63% and lastly Greece with a rate of - 43%.
In the following graph we compare the Portuguese rate of road fatality per 
million inhabitants with the four countries with the lowest rates of road 
fatality per million inhabitants, France, Germany, UK and the Netherlands:
Graph 2.2
Trend in the number of road Fatalities per million inhabitants. 
Portugal compared to four countries with low rates (1991-2008)
Source: Based on Eurostat data.
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As seen above, there was a positive approximation all throughout the 
time frame, albeit, Portugal still had a higher rate than the four countries 
considered at the end of the period.
Finally we compare the road fatality rate per million inhabitants in Portu-
gal to the European Union with 15 and 27 member states.
Graph 2.3
Trend in the number of road fatalities per million inhabitants. 
Portugal compared to the European Union with 15 and 27 member states (1991-2008)
Source: Based on Eurostat data.
As illustrated, Portugal registered a positive trend all throughout the period, 
converging to the European Union averages with 27 and 15 member states. 
At the end of the period, the road fatality rate per million inhabitants 
was 78 in the European Union with 27 member states, having Portugal 
checked in with 83 deaths and the European Union with 15 member states 
registering a rate of 73 deaths per million inhabitants in 2007. In sum, a 
sharp decrease was verified in relation to Portugal whose rate drew close 
to the European Union rates.

III 
Trend of Road Accidents with Casualties in 
Portugal (1959-2010)
As illustrated in the graph below, accidents14 with casualties in Portugal 
have registered cyclical peaks and valleys between 1959 and 2010:
Graph 3.1
Trend in the number of accidents with victims in Portugal (1959-2010)
Source: Based on data obtained from the Portuguese Department of Motor Vehicles and the ANSR.
14 Unless otherwise, “accidents” are understood as accidents with victims.
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Since the beginning of the period and during the years that led up to 1973 
a constant slope was recorded – except for 1970 – giving way to a period 
of decline that began in 1974 and lasted until 1977. From that year onward 
and until 1982 the casualty toll grew again, reaching in this year 35,324 
accidents with victims, a figure similar to that recorded 10 years earlier in 
1972. From 1982 until 1985 the number of accidents declined once again 
coinciding with a slump in economic growth.
From 1985 to 1992 the number of accidents with victims soared, having 
reached an all-time high in 1992 with 50,851 accidents with casualties. 
There is evidence of a positive correlation with the level of economic 
development as a result of Portugal’s entry into the European Community 
in 1986.
In the years that followed, 1993 and 1994, a decline in the number of 
accidents was reported. From 1994 to 1997, the accident toll ascended 
again and began to decrease in 1997 continuing steadily until 2008. In 
2009 the number of accidents grew once again and during 2010, the toll 
slightly dropped (0.16%) in relation to 2009.
Trend in the Number of Road Accident Deaths in Portugal
As can be viewed in the graph below, road fatalities in Portugal during 
1959 -2010 tend to increase and subsequently decline:
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Graph 3.2
Trend in the number of road deaths in Portugal (1959-2010)
Source: Based on ANSR data.
In Portugal, the death toll was recorded in accordance with the number 
of victims who perished within the first 24 hours following an accident. 
This method led to a lower recorded death toll when confronted with that 
obtained using the method in practice in most European countries, along 
with other countries, and consisted in tallying – as fatal victims – those 
deaths that occurred within 30 days subsequent to a crash.
As it turned out, there was a discrepancy between criteria used for register-
ing fatalities in Portugal and that used in remaining countries, whereupon it 
was decided that for international comparison purposes, the road accident 
death toll registered in Portugal in accordance with the 24 hour method 
should be multiplied by a factor of 1.14. Nonetheless, annual road fatality 
records continued to be conducted based on the “24 hour criterion”.
In this context and as a result of such discrepancy, the number of road 
fatalities began to be registered using the 30 day method, in order to unify 
the criterion used in Portugal with that used internationally.
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The National Authority for Road Safety confirmed that, on average, the 
road death toll was in fact 26% higher than that recorded using the 24 
hour method.
As shown in graph 3.2, the death toll grew – in general terms – until 1975 
where it peaked an all-time high of 2,676 deaths (using the 24 hour crite-
rion). During the period considered, 1975 was the year that marked the 
downward trend that lasted up until 1975, although not so pronounced, 
having increased again in 1988, year in which we witness a decreasing 
trend, reaching the death toll of 741 in 2010.
Trend in the Number of Seriously Injured Road Accident Victims in Por-
tugal
In relation to the number of seriously injured road accident victims, the 
trend for the period 1987-2010 can be viewed in the following graph15:
Graph 3.3
Trend in the number of seriously injured road accident victims in Portugal (1987-2010)
Source: Based on data obtained from the Portuguese Department of Motor Vehicles and the ANSR.
15 Data only available from 1987 onwards.
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The trend of serious road injury decreased over the period illustrated. 
Between 1987 and the end of the period, the accumulated variance rate 
of seriously injured was - 144%. Over the time-span above, only in four 
years of the time series were rates of positive variance verified, namely, 
in 2009 with a positive variance rate of about 1%.
Apropos of the number of seriously injured, there is some discrepancy be-
tween data collected by police authorities and data recorded by hospitals, 
situation that exists in Portugal and in other countries as corroborated by 
several researchers16. It has been found that the number of serious injuries 
recorded by hospitals is in fact higher than the number recorded by police 
authorities17.
As for Portugal, in regards to seriously injured victims, the subsequent 
graph gives the reader a trend overview of the two time series pertaining 
to the data provided by the Ministry of Health18 (hospital data) and by the 
ANSR (data recorded by police authorities).
16 Cf. Amoros (2008); Elvik (2009); Derriks (2007); Chisvert, ye Fan (2010); Ronan (2008).
17 Police and Police Authorities refer to both the Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP) and 
the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR).
18 Data was not provided for the period between 2000-2009.
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Graph 3.4
Trend in the number of seriously injured road accident victims in Portugal recorded by 
hospitals and by Police Authorities (2000-2009)
Source: Based on data provided by the ANSR and the Ministry of Health.
The difference between the two time series is high. As evidenced in various 
studies referred in footnote 16, one should be mindful that the classifica-
tion found in records kept by police officials may be biased, where the 
same victim can be classified as slightly injured by police and seriously 
injured by hospital staff. The use of police records in assessing the social 
and economic costs of road accidents has led to biased results. Ultimately, 
the cost calculated for seriously injured victims is inferior to the cost that 
would have been obtained if the number recorded by hospitals had been 
used.
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Trend in the Number of Slightly Injured Road Accident Victims in Portugal
In what concerns the number of minor road accident injuries, let’s take a 
glance at the following graph19:
Graph 3.5
Trend in the number of slightly injured road accident victims (1996-2010)
Source: Based on ANSR data.
With regard to minor injuries, a steady decreasing trend is verified all 
throughout the period, although not as sharp as in the case of deaths and 
serious injuries, reaching nearly 56,000 minor injuries in 1996 dropping 
down to nearly 44,000 in 2010.
19 Data only available from 1996 onwards.

IV 
Methods Used in Estimating the Economic and 
Social Cost of Road Accidents
There are several methods among which we highlight the following:
a) Human Capital or GDP Method20
This method is based on the production potential of the fatal or disabled 
individual during his lifetime in the absence of a road accident. It consists 
in comprising the accident costs associated to the loss of future production, 
hospital costs, property damages, administrative and non-monetary costs;
b) Court Compensation Method
This method considers that society can assess accident costs through 
indemnity awarded  by courts, a proxy measure of real costs;
c) Life insurance method21
This method is based on the use of the insurance premium that an indi-
vidual would be willing to pay, coupled with the probability of being killed 
or injured in a road accident. One of the criticisms made to this approach 
20 Donário (2010a), pp. 101-112 and 649-660.
21 Mishan (1976), pp. 300-303.
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is that it only focuses on compensation provided to third parties and 
overlooks fatal victims, which – naturally – cannot be compensated;
d) Willingness-to-Pay Method
Such method considers the maximum amount that a person would be 
willing to pay to reduce the probability of having an accident and being 
killed or injured.
Withal, the two main approaches that have been used are: the Human 
Capital and the Willingness-to-Pay methods, which are analyzed below.
4.1 – Willingness-To-Pay Approach (WTP)
As an ex-ante approach22 it is grounded on the principles of welfare eco-
nomics, in line with the so-called principle of consumer sovereignty which 
tends to portray the interests and preferences of the individual, who is 
considered to be a rational maximizer of benefits and a minimizer of costs.
Specifically, willingness-to-pay23 is defined as the amount a person would 
be willing to pay to reduce risk of having an accident24 and therefore the 
risk of death or injury, which ultimately constitutes the individual’s Stated 
Preferences (SA) which in turn may differ from Revealed Preferences (RP). 
22 Feldman (1997), p. 2. This author labels it as “probabilistic willingness-to-pay”.
23 Willingness-to-pay reflects what in economics is called a “consumer surplus” and consists 
in the utility that exceeds the market price or, to be more precise, it portrays the varying 
level of the individual’s utility because of the reduction in accident risk and of death or 
injury.
24 Risk reduction is not observable in the market but develops within the context of 
scarcity, through the choices, representing an opportunity cost.
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This later set of preferences can be interpreted as the amount an individual 
currently spends on his/her road safety25 through their actions.
This method26 serves as a proxy used to estimate the potential value of 
non-market goods and combines the determinants of accident cost, namely 
costs resulting from decreased social utility, that is, it tends to coalesce all 
the social costs aside from those borne by accident victims (externalities). 
Here, we can allude to the costs associated with income, the cost with 
leisure, the cost of avoiding pain and suffering and the cost of relative risk 
aversion of a certain activity.
It should be noted that risk is both an individual and social cost and is pres-
ent in virtually all aspects of life, making high accident risk a factor that 
should be taken into account whenever possible. Moreover, the attitude 
of individuals towards risk27 should be contemplated in the policies and 
measures adopted to reduce accidents and their effects. Note, since the 
majority of individuals are risk-averse, high accident risk translates into 
a high additive factor of accident cost.
This method implies a trade-off between a given current “state of the 
world” with a certain level of welfare (utility) without road accidents and 
another potential “state of the world” with a lower level of welfare because 
of probable accidents. Such a trade-off determines, among other factors, 
the level of driving care observed on the road28.
25 Frey (2004) – Valuing Public Goods: The Satisfaction Aproach, “Due to the hypothetical 
nature of the questions asked and the unfamiliarity of the task, one cannot exclude that 
respondents fail to consider the effect of their budget constraints and substitutes.”, p. 7.
26 Carthy [et al] On the Contigent Valuation of Safety... (1999) “...collective WTP and WTA 
amounts can most effectively be estimated by asking a representative sample of people more 
or less directly about the sums that they would individually be willing to pay or to accept as 
compensation for pre-specified variations in safety—commonly referred to as the direct 
“contingent valuation” (CV) approach”, p. 188.
27 Donário (2010a), pp.421-423 and Donário (2010b), pp. 15-22.
28 Donário (2010a), pp. 165-178.
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Since, life in itself is a supreme good and a requisite of one’s ability to 
enjoy the utility of all other goods, death reduces the utility function of an 
individual to zero. Thus, the value of life, from an ontological point of view, 
is infinite and therefore immensurable. What is really sought out by many 
is the so-called Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) and not necessarily the value 
of a life of a particular person, because as said before, it is incalculable. The 
statistical value of life, as stated by Arianne Blaeij “... is concerned with the 
valuation of changes in the level of risk exposure, rather than the valuation of 
life of a specific individual, and reported this as a ‘normalized value”29.
Similarly, in a study conducted in the U.S. in 1976, Barbara Moyer Faigin 
adds:
“...the cost components and the total of these components are indicators 
of the significance of the motor vehicle accident problem.”30
However, it is important that we point out that what is sought out by 
the willingness-to-pay approach is not the valuation of life per se of a 
particular individual, but rather the attainment of the probable quantum 
that the individual is willing to pay to reduce a percentage of the risk of 
death or injury or, as said earlier, the sovereignty of the consumer through 
his revealed preferences. Regarding the value of life we quote, josé María 
Abellán Perpiñán:
“Since human loss cannot be directly valued, such can be assessed from 
the aggregate of individuals’ willingness-to-pay for a small reduction in 
the risk of death in a crash. This aggregate consequently provides the 
monetary amount assigned by society to avoid the death of any person 
(a statistical life) resulting from a road accident”31.
29 Blaeij (2003), p. 4.
30 Faigin (1976), p. 1.
31 Abellán [et al] (2010), p. 2. Our translation.
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This method demands the consideration of the income and/or wealth 
effect (composite variables), or other goods (such as life and physical 
integrity) known in behavioral economic literature as the endowment 
effect32 (reference point), which has effects on WTP versus the propensity 
to accept compensation (willingness-to-accept – WTA). The endowment 
effect reflects the difference between WTP and WTA.
This effect is reinforced by the framing33 effect34, evident when presenting 
the same question in different formats whereby a small change in the way 
the question is presented – framing – relative to stochastic matters, may 
have a high impact on the choice regarding the quantum an individual is 
willing pay to reduce the risk of death or injury in a road accident. How-
ever, individuals have a tendency to select inconsistent choices, depending 
on whether the question is framed to concentrate on losses or gains35.
According to Thaler36, the minimum compensation demanded for ac-
cepting a 0.001 risk of sudden death was higher by one or two orders of 
magnitude than the amount people are willing to pay (WTP) to eliminate an 
identical level of risk in the future. This discrepancy is a manifestation of 
loss aversion37 when the good “life” is valued as a loss (instant endowment 
effect38) and as a gain, when it is perceived as decreased risk of death.
The endowment effect undermines the Coase theorem assertion, according 
to which, the allocation of resources will be independent of the assignment 
32 Kahneman (1991), pp. 193-206.
33 Cf. Tversky; Kahneman (1981).
34 See: Kahneman (1979), p. 285.
35 The development of these effects by Kahneman and Tversky refuted the independence 
axiom of the expected utility theory developed by john von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern (1947).
36 Cf. Thaler (1980).
37 Kahneman; Tversky (1979), pp. 263-292.
38 Kahneman [et al] (2003), p. 53.
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of property rights when costless trades are possible, leading parties to seek 
an efficient outcome in spite of the initial allocation of rights39.
4.2 – Human Capital Method
As an ex-post method, it places its attention on the potential production lost 
by an accident victim, killed or injured, and focuses on the negative effects 
for society leaving aside individual preferences which are considered in 
the willingness-to-pay method.
In this approach, one of the most important factors of the social cost of 
accidents is subsumed to potential production loss per dead or disabled 
accident victim, whose present value is calculated by a discount factor with 
reference to the base period (year) – in this case – the date of the accident.
Health costs (hospital costs and the like), damage to vehicles and other 
property damages are considered by this approach, in addition to, the 
estimated costs of diminishing utility represented by pain and suffering 
(physical or psychological) sustained by victims and their families, which 
we label moral or non-monetary damages.
Non-monetary damages should be assessed with recourse to whatever 
methods available. Such damages consist in intangible losses translated as 
a decrease in utility resulting from harm to personal or moral goods that 
comprise the utility function40 (happiness function) of each person, affect-
ing what is universally known as joi de vivre41. Non-monetary damages, as 
expected, do not depend on the ability to obtain income.
Since this method takes into account the gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, the social cost of accidents varies accordingly – where in spite 
39 Cf. Coase (1988).
40 Or, in legal terms, they comprise the legal domain of a natural person.
41 Cf. Gerondeau (1979).
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of identical methodology – the cost is greater in countries with a higher 
GDP per capita.
The use of this method often leads to lower values  in relation to those 
obtained through the willingness-to-pay approach, thereby setting a 
benchmark for accident prevention policies.
Considering what was said apropos of the WTP approach, the high dis-
crepancies witnessed regarding the statistical value of life – estimated in 
various studies – are explained in part by the different formats in which 
questions are presented to respondents, mainly because of the endowment 
and framing effects. This results in very different answers with regard to the 
quantum an individual is willing pay to reduce the risk of death or injury 
in a road accident.
For these reasons, we believe that the Human Capital method used to 
estimate the social cost of road accidents tends to be more trustworthy 
than the WTP method.
4.3 – The Method Used
Regardless of the implementation of the willingness-to-pay method in 
several studies, we chose to employ the Human Capital (HC) approach. 
Although it is an ex-post method, it allows us to use data from several 
institutions, particularly public institutions, for a period of 15 years, dis-
playing the trend in the cost of accidents in Portugal and revealing the 
effectiveness of policies all throughout their implementation.
This method renders estimated costs inferior to those obtained using the 
willingness-to-pay method and is chiefly based on historical data, allowing 
us to estimate a benchmark for policies based on a cost-benefit analysis.
For its part, the WTP method would have to be based on national surveys, 
where it would only be possible to assess the cost of accidents for the 
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period (year) in which the surveys were conducted. Hence, we believe 
that the method chosen (CH) will render us an adequate estimate of the 
social costs of road accidents in Portugal allowing us to analyze the trend 
of these costs over a period of 15 years.
V 
Data
The data used in this study is referent to:
a) Annual number of accidents with victims;
b) Annual number of fatal accidents;
c) Annual number of accidents with seriously injured victims;
d) Annual number of accidents with minor injuries;
e) Number of accidents with injuries in general.
We aimed to estimate the average cost that each fatal and seriously injured 
victim represents to society in order to determine the social cost of fatal 
accidents and the social cost of accidents with seriously injured victims 
in mainland Portugal.
The social cost of road accidents comprises monetary and non-monetary 
damages sustained in a crash. It is inevitable that negative effects emanate 
from road accidents, whether it is financial, personal, etc... It entails a cost 
not only for the individual but for society as a whole, that is to say, there 
are always negative externalities.
The data used in this study was provided by the following organizations:
• Health Care System Administration (ACSS);
• National Authority for Road Safety (ANSR);
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• Ministry of Health;
• European Central Bank;
• Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation (FFMS) (PORDATA, FFMS 
public statistical information service);
• National Police Authority (PSP);
• Portuguese National Guard (GNR);
• Institute for Justice Financial Management and Infrastructure 
(IGFIJ);
• Portuguese Insurance Institute (ISP);
• Institute of Judicial Technologies and Computerization (ITIJ);
• National Statistics Institute (INE).
With regard to the data of the remaining components of the social cost 
of road accidents, we were unable to attain such information from the 
competent authorities, albeit, we did rely on a study conducted in 1987 by 
the Portuguese Road Safety Association (Prevenção Rodoviária Portuguesa) 
in order to estimate these values . In doing so, we used the yearly number 
of registered deaths and injuries as a guideline and considered the exist-
ing research category layout although without available data (mainly in 
regards to justice).
VI 
Components of the Economic and Social Cost of 
Road Accidents
The economic and social costs of accidents can be categorized into:
– Monetary
– Non-monetary or moral.
In turn, monetary costs are classified as:
– Direct
– Indirect.
Direct monetary costs of road accidents include:
– Damage to vehicles and other public and private property;
– Hospital costs related to victims;
– Cost resulting from time expended on hospital visits;
– Ambulance fees and victim transport costs;
– Loss adjustment costs;
– Direct intervention of law enforcement;
– Funeral expenses of victims.
Indirect monetary costs of road accidents consist in:
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– Value of lost potential production of fatal and injured victims;
– Insurer administrative costs;
– Value of court fees;
– Attorney fees;
– Costs of preventing accidents or road safety;
– Operating costs of courts;
– Cost of accident risk;
– Cost associated with negative externalities that affect the environ-
ment, which will not be considered in this study because of the 
lack of available data.
Non-monetary damages include pain and suffering endured by victims and 
third parties. Such costs will be discussed further on in our study.
6.1 – Value of lost production
With regard to the value of production loss42, such is obtained through the 
sum of:
• Fatal victims;
• Seriously injured;
• Slightly injured.
6.1.1 – Loss of production relative to fatalities
When calculating the value of lost production capacity of fatal accident 
victims – in the market – we thought it would be best to go with the GDP 
method and not exclude consumption, since it is believed that even when 
individuals withdraw from the labor market, they continue to “consume” 
42 To calculate the value of lost production follow closely the method contained in Donário 
(2010a), pp. 655-657.
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contributing thereof to the growth of domestic expenditure consequently 
increasing the domestic product (fundamental identity between expendi-
ture, product and income).
Costs pertaining to fatalities should also take into account potential pro-
duction loss outside the market (which consists in unpaid work) related to 
home, family and the community43. These are opportunity costs reflected 
as losses outside the 40-hour work-week. Although they are difficult to es-
timate44, there are studies that have estimated these costs at approximately 
30% of formal employment income (obtained in the market). Thus, losses 
resulting from road accidents reduce the social utility function and are not 
usually absorbed by the national product’s estimate.
In calculating the value of production loss, Portuguese GDP per capita was 
used along with the number of work years lost per fatal victim, the fatality 
toll45 per annum with an added 26%46 and the update rate of production 
loss. This rate is the function of the average net interest rate for financial 
investments and the annual growth rate of production
As for the Portuguese GDP per capita, we decided to use the gross domes-
tic product per capita at constant prices (2006)47, eliminating therefore 
the impact of inflation. Concurrently, a relatively current base-year was 
used so as to minimize probable misinterpretation of general price level 
variability. Since the national product per capita differs from country to 
country, production loss will also be different. This makes international 
comparisons very difficult.
43 Faigin (1976), p. 1.
44 Atkins (1981), p. 47.
45 Statistics only considered as fatal victims those who perished at the scene of the ac-
cident or within the following 24 hours. For international comparison 14% was added on.
46 The ANSR estimated that on average the official number of fatalities is higher by about 
26%.
47 See: Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation.
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Regarding the loss in productive working life per fatal victim we made use 
of the data provided by the National Authority for Road Safety (ANSR)48 
referent to the number of deaths per age group which allowed us to obtain 
an estimate of the median age of a fatal victim.
Considering that estimated life expectancy in Portugal is on average 80 
years of age, we were able to obtain the number of lost productive working 
years per road fatality by subtracting the median age of a fatal victim from 
average life expectancy. It is worth mentioning that the estimated cost 
measures the value of person’s activity, regardless of whether or not the 
fatal victim is employed.
The annual road fatality death toll used to calculate the overall value of 
lost production per fatality was that contained in the National Authority 
for Road Safety 2010 Report, with a correction of 26%, which resulted from 
the ANSR’s conclusion that the annual fatality toll should be adjusted so 
as to provide a more accurate perception of reality.
Update Rate Used
The update rate49 of the value of lost production is a composite rate of the 
average net interest rate for financial investments and the annual growth 
rate of production. In what concerns the average net interest rate for 
financial investments, we decided to use the average Euribor benchmark 
rate50 with a maturity period of 6 months during 1996 - 2010, since this 
period is the time interval under analysis. The Euribor was also chosen 
because it is the interest rate that depicts the change in money supply and 
demand in the European interbank market and, therefore, represents the 
capacity that the banking system has to finance itself efficiently and at the 
same time provide for its needs of liquidity. In this manner, the Euribor is 
48 Autoridade Nacional de Segurança Rodoviária (2010) – National Authority for Road 
Safety.
49 This rate is also known as the time preference rate.
50 Vide European Central Bank.
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an adequate proxy for measuring the average net interest rate for financial 
investments.
Our choice of a longer maturity period of 6 months instead of 3 months was 
due to the fact that the former period portrays the change in the Euribor 
rate more reliantly. On the other hand – compared with an even longer 
maturity period of 12 months – the 6 month period is more flexible when 
it comes to the adjustment capacity of financial markets.
The annual growth rate of production used to calculate the update rate 
of the value of lost production is the result of the average annual growth 
rate of the Portuguese gross domestic product at constant prices (2006)51 
during the period between 1996 and 2010. Note, that the impact of infla-
tion was excluded since it was decided that the value of lost production 
should be assessed in accordance to the effective wealth created and not 
the volatility of the economy’s overall price level which would skew the 
intended analysis.
We also decided that it would be best to use the median age of fatal victims 
rather than the average age.
6.1.2 – Seriously injured victims
The cost related with seriously injured victims can be divided into five 
components:
• Hospital costs, including medication;
• Costs arising from the total loss of potential production in relation 
to seriously injured victims with 100% permanent disability;
• Loss of production resulting from reduced productivity due to 
permanent partial disability;
• Loss of production resulting from temporary disability;
51 Vide Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation.
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• Costs related to the risk premium.
6.1.2.1 – Hospital costs with seriously injured victims
Such costs represent the expenses that society incurs in the treatment 
of seriously injured road accident victims (stabilization and recovery) 
whatever their level of severity. These costs are recorded by hospitals and 
the records are kept with the Ministry of Health.
6.1.2.2 – Costs pertaining to the total loss of potential production 
with seriously injured victims
a) Seriously injured victims with 100% permanent disability
The costs that represent the loss of production of seriously injured victims 
with 100% permanent disability entail loss of production – in and out – of 
the market. Individuals with a 100% permanent disability are not only 
unable to engage in any activity but their special condition requires that 
other social resources be allocated to satisfy their needs, in particular, 
specialized human capital, which constitutes an opportunity cost.
b) Seriously injured victims with permanent partial disability
A fraction of seriously injured road accident victims are left with some 
degree of permanent partial disability. These cases, in general, entail 
lifetime effects which are reflected in the disabled person’s production 
capacity.
The various degrees of permanent disability, which are clinically as-
sessed, affect future production in and out of the market. The percentage 
of permanent clinical impairment is a proxy measure for assessing the cost 
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of the decrease in expected production that could have been obtained in 
the absence of disability.
c) Seriously injured victims with temporary disability
Another fraction of seriously injured victims sustain temporary disability 
– total or partial – during a more or less extended period beyond the time 
of hospitalization and recovery, whose effects also constitute a portion of 
the cost of road accidents.
d) Seriously injured victims and the risk premium
In the case of risk-averse individuals, we can define the risk premium as the 
maximum amount an individual is willing to pay (or not receive) to avoid a 
certain level of risk which determines the certainty equivalent and in turn 
is associated to threshold probability.
Whenever an indemnity or compensation dispute arises there are two 
main ways of settling it, aside from an amicable agreement between the 
parties:
i) Out-of-court settlements with insurers, and
ii) Lawsuits.
Bearing in mind that most accident victims are risk-averse and considering 
that the degree of risk-aversion varies inversely with the level of income 
and wealth; the greater the degree of risk aversion the higher the risk 
premium. Furthermore, as long as individuals remain risk-averse, the lower 
their income and wealth the higher the risk premium.
In Portugal’s case, high variability (variance) of court awards for com-
parable cases and high judicial delay make judicial protection a risky 
prospect. On the other hand, greater predictability, lower variance of the 
compensation set by insurers and expeditious indemnity payments lead 
to a higher degree of certainty.
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Thus, risk-averse individuals (seriously injured victims) are likely to prefer 
a certain method rather than an uncertain method of dispute resolution, 
meaning that they choose compensation set by insurers in spite of it being 
lower than the average indemnity award set by courts52 for similar cases.
The difference between the expected value of damages awarded by courts 
and the amount set by insurers for comparable cases, can be regarded as 
the risk premium which in itself is a social cost and should integrate the 
social cost of road accidents.
Therefore, aside from individual utility, the social utility function is nega-
tively affected, in the long term, due to permanent disability of seriously 
injured victims. In cases where a high degree of permanent disability 
exists, material and human resources (human capital) are diverted from 
other productive functions (market and non-market) and are allocated to 
cater to the special needs of accident victims with permanent disability.
e) Effects of permanent disability
Injury contemplated in permanent disability mainly generates two types 
of effects:
i) Monetary damages, which include property damage to vehicles, 
medical and pharmaceutical expenses and personal injury that 
precludes full or partial performance of ordinary day-to-day 
activities (whether it is market or non-market), and
ii) Non-monetary damages, which may be permanent and don’t nec-
essarily imply an economic loss in a narrow sense. They epitomize 
social cost. They also bring about pain and suffering which is not 
only sustained by the victim but by family and friends53.
52 Donário (2010a), pp. 236-238 and 325-328.
53 Cf. Sá (1992).
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6.1.3 – Slightly injured victims
With regard to the assessment of production loss of slightly injured victims 
we considered – with an excess margin of error – those individuals who 
sustain minor injuries following a road accident and are, on average, 
inactive for a period of 24 hours. In many of these cases, we found that 
hospitalization and recovery – and therefore consequent production 
loss – was inferior to 24 hours.
6.2 – Administrative costs of insurers
Characterized as indirect costs they consist in insurer administrative costs 
namely operating costs, employee wages, advertising, administration and 
taxes associated with road accident injured victims.
In this section we used data provided by the Portuguese Insurance Institute 
(ISP). Despite the difficulties in obtaining data for the period under review, 
i.e. 1996-2010, the ISP was able to provide data pertaining to the period 
2000-2009. In this context, we chose to consider the years between 1996 
and 1999 as having the same value of insurer administrative costs as in the 
year 2000, and the year of 2010 as having the same administrative costs 
as the year of 2009.
6.3 – Indirect costs with public road safety institutions
There are public entities whose main objective is road safety. They rep-
resent government intervention as a result of market failures in the road 
mobility and safety market.
Indeed, the majority of road users have imperfect information, not only 
in relation to effective probabilities of crashes but also in regards to the 
negative externalities their road behavior may cause.
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Subjective probabilities – based on heuristic mechanisms (trial-and-error) 
– are influenced by various biases, to be more precise, individuals tend to 
make judgments about the likelihood of future events based on the ease 
of imagining such events, which translates into “availability heuristic” 
that leads to another bias known as hindsight bias which is the knowledge 
and understanding that a person has about an event only after it occurs, 
and thus, can easily imagine similar events, consequently overestimating 
probabilities.
Another bias in the assessment of probabilities is known as “represen-
tativeness heuristic” which consists in judging conditional probabilities 
in accordance to how the data represents a hypothesis or an example in 
which people rely on. Sometimes, this heuristic way judging probabilities 
is erroneous.
Further, another bias identified as the “law of small numbers” leads indi-
viduals to think that the characteristics of a sample population can be 
estimated from a small number of observations or data points, leading 
them into error.
Such justifies the need for institutions like the National Authority for 
Road Safety, who seeks to minimize the economic and social costs of road 
accidents through the implementation of various strategies and whose 
operating costs should be considered as economic and social costs of 
accidents.
Having been established in 2007, the ANSR’s budget is only available from 
2008 onward. Therefore, we made the assumption that the expenditure on 
road safety in previous years (from 1996 to 2007) is similar to the amount 
spent in 2008.
However, ANSR expenditures are not the only costs involved in this cat-
egory. In this context, we draw on a study carried out by the Portuguese 
Road Safety Association in 198754 in order to estimate the remaining costs 
54 Donário (2010a), p. 106 et seq.
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of road safety. In consequence, we add the estimated amounts based on 
this study to the ANSR’s budget for the period under review.
6.4 – Operating costs of courts
Part of the operating costs of courts should be attributed to the economic 
and social cost of accidents as indirect costs, since human and material 
resources are allocated to satisfy the demand for judicial protection in 
settling disputes emerging from road accidents, namely in cases involv-
ing fatalities and seriously injured victims. Such emergent disputes also 
entail other indirect costs which can be construed as contributing towards 
judicial delay and court congestion.
Since we were unable to obtain the necessary data from the competent 
judicial authorities, we estimated these costs  based on the study conducted 
by the Portuguese Road Safety Association in 1987, aforementioned, taking 
into account the number of road accident fatalities and injuries while 
maintaining the same research category layout.
6.5 – Hospital costs associated with fatal and seriously injured 
victims
In this section we used the data provided by the Health Care System 
Administration (ACSS) of the Portuguese Ministry of Health. Despite the 
difficulties in obtaining the data for the period under review, the ACSS was 
able to provide data for the period 2000-2009. In this context, we decided 
that that the years ranging from 1996 to 1999 would have the same value 
of hospital costs relative to fatalities and seriously injured than those 
recorded in 2000 and that for the year 2010 hospital costs would be same 
as those registered in 2009.
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6.6 – Ambulance fees and victim transport costs
Costs and fees for transporting road accident fatal and seriously injured 
victims to hospitals were provided by the National Institute for Medical 
Emergencies (INEM) for the period 2004 - 2009. Since the period under 
review ranges from 1996 to 2010, it was decided that the transport costs for 
the years between 1996 and 2003 would be the same as those recorded in 
2004 while the costs pertaining to 2010 would be similar to those in 2009.
6.7 – Cost of law enforcement
In this section we used the data provided by the National Police Authority 
(PSP) and the Portuguese National Guard (GNR). There was some difficulty 
in obtaining data for the period under review, albeit, the National Police 
Authority did release data pertaining to the period 2000 - 2010. On the 
other hand, we were able to obtain data from the Portuguese National 
Guard referent to the period 2001 - 2010. In this context, we were able 
to combine both sets of available data by extrapolating information from 
the data obtained from the Portuguese National Guard for the year 2000. 
Once this was done, we decided that the costs of law enforcement for the 
years 1996-1999, as in the previous categories, would be the same as those 
recorded in 2000.
6.8 – Cost of property damage to vehicles
Monetary damages to property can be differentiated from personal injury. 
In the case of monetary damages to property we witness a loss of utility 
of economic goods. The valuation of reproducible goods damaged in a 
road accident demands that the cost of replacement or repair be taken 
into account – whenever possible – and that the choice should rest upon 
whichever is lower so as to minimize social costs, i.e. maximize efficiency.
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In this section we made use of the data provided by the Portuguese Insur-
ance Institute (ISP). Despite the problems in obtaining data for the period 
under review, the ISP was able to provide data for the period 2000-2009. In 
this context, we chose to attribute the same value of insurer administrative 
costs recorded in 2000 for the years 1996 -1999 while the costs pertaining 
to 2010 would be similar to those in 2009.
6.9 – Accident loss adjustment costs
The competent authorities could not provide the necessary data. In this 
sense, we drew on the study conducted by the Portuguese Road Safety 
Association in 1987 and estimated the values  for the period under analysis.
6.10 – Attorney Fees
The competent judicial authorities were also unable to provide the 
necessary data. Once again, we resorted to the study carried out by the 
Portuguese Road Safety Association in 1987 and estimated the values  for 
the period under review.
6.11 – Court Fees
Court fees portray the value, price or expense with a lawsuit until its 
final outcome – expressed as a certain factual situation or the declaration 
of a right -, which is from the outset, a factor to take into account when 
assessing the economic and social cost of road accidents. Although we 
had some information on court fees pertaining to road accident lawsuits, 
it was insufficient in quantitative terms for an accurate estimation. In this 
sense, it was decided, once again, to resort to the study carried out by the 
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Portuguese Road Safety Association in 1987 and estimate the values  for 
the period under review.
6.12 – Funeral Expenses
Although funeral expenses are somewhat irrelevant when assessing the 
economic and social cost of road accidents, they remain an important 
category due to their religious and customary nature and, therefore, must 
be taken into account. However, it was not possible to obtain updated 
information from the competent authorities because of the inexistence 
of such records. In this sense, it was decided, once again, to resort to the 
study carried out by the Portuguese Road Safety Association in 1987 and 
estimate the values  for the period under review.
6.13 – Non-monetary or moral costs
Such costs are unquantifiable market costs that emerge from road ac-
cidents. Moreover, they reduce the utility function of individuals – as in 
the case of injured victims – because they deprive the injured and their 
loved ones of the normal pleasures of living, and in the case of death, the 
effects of this cost are transferred to family members. Pain and suffering 
represent costs to society and are defined as personal moral costs. They 
are non-market costs that can only be estimated through the use of proxies.
Indeed, the absence of a price set by the market in relation to non-monetary 
costs results in a market failure, justifying government intervention in the 
assignment of a price. However, government doesn’t assign a value of 
compensation, because such is impossible in cases of wrongful death (since 
the utility function of the deceased no longer exists) but it also intervenes 
to assign a price in certain cases of permanent disability.
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There are also negative effects on third parties, since the capacity to 
consume or enjoy certain goods is eliminated or reduced, which ultimately 
leads to a decrease in the utility function (or welfare). Surely, in order 
to remove utility (pleasure) though the use or consumption of certain 
goods, it is necessary that certain capabilities exist, that when eliminated 
or reduced, cause certain goods to become useless. For instance, loss of 
sight, hearing, mobility and so on. In these cases, and the like, two types 
of effects emerge55:
1 – Decreased capability to obtain income in the market and its proxy 
translated as the decrease of services rendered outside the market, that is, 
services rendered at home, for the family and for the community (which 
are opportunity costs), imposing other probable costs that arise from the 
use of services provided by others and the use of alternative goods that 
would not have used in the absence of disability;
2 – Decrease of the utility function as a result of the elimination or reduc-
tion of certain vital functions of the victim, bearing in mind the principle 
of diminishing marginal utility. For example, in the case of blindness (or 
another vital function essential to welfare), high compensation awarded to 
the victim – no matter how high it is – it cannot be spent on goods whose 
utility can only be attained through eyesight or the vital function affected 
as a result of the accident. In this manner, the victim’s options of consump-
tion are limited, therefore reducing his utility function (translating into cost 
or disutility). In other words, no matter how much available income he 
may have at his disposal, it would be difficult and in some cases virtually 
impossible to attain a level of satisfaction equal to what would exist in 
absence of disability.
The appliance of income on alternative goods shall constitute diminishing 
marginal utility, as a result of limited choices, reflecting a decrease in the 
marginal value of each monetary unit (euro). One of the ways in which 
55 Pintos Ager (2000) and Friedman (1982).
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we can estimate these non-monetary costs is by using the proxy of court 
awards.
In effect, the quantitative valuation (monetary assessment) carried out by 
the courts regarding non-monetary damages sustained by fatal or disabled 
victims can be used as a proxy for the said cost to society, as shall be 
explained further on in this study.
As provided by Portuguese law, in Article 496 § 1 of the Portuguese 
Civil Code “In setting compensation, serious non-pecuniary losses deserv-
ing legal protection should be considered. Therefore, when courts assess 
non-monetary damages, translated into pain, suffering and anguish, they 
act on society’s behalf as a sovereign competent power, assigning – as a 
proxy – a monetary value of compensation to such damages, in view of the 
existing social and moral values in that given society. This valuation will 
diachronically vary with the change in social and moral values over time.
Given the high subjectivity in the assessment of non-monetary damages 
by courts, which leads to large variance, we shall use the average of a large 
sample in the attempt to obtain a non-biased estimate of these costs.
In this context, the estimation of non-monetary damages was based on the 
information56 contained in nearly 260 judgments from different Portuguese 
Courts of Appeal, pertaining to traffic accident claims in which non-
monetary damages were awarded.
56 Vide Portuguese Ministry of justice, Institute of judicial Technologies and Computeriza-
tion (ITIJ).
VII 
Empirical Study
The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the values obtained regarding  the 
components of the economic and social cost of road accidents. This is done 
according to the general-to-specific approach.
7.1 – Total value of lost production
The total value of lost production, obtained through the ex-post human 
capital method, includes the potential loss of productivity or production 
capacity of all road accident casualties (fatalities and injured victims). The 
cost of potential output lost by victims as a result of premature death or 
disability has been corrected to present day value by using the update rate.
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7.1.1 – Value of lost production of total victims
The following graph illustrates the trend in the value of total production 
loss of total casualties in the period 1996 -2010:
Graph 7.1.1.1
Value of production loss of total victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 6).
In fact, with the exception of 2006 to 2007, all other years consistently 
exhibited a decrease from year to year. In this context, the year 1996 
displayed the highest absolute value of lost production, nearly 1.522 
billion euros, whereas the lowest absolute value was recorded in 2010 
representing a loss in nearly 540 million euros.
If the total value of lost production was substantial in 1996, about 1.2% of 
GDP, this figure represented about 0.3% of GDP in 2010. Nevertheless, the 
total amount of production that society lost, over the period considered, 
amounted to approximately 15. 153 billion euros. If we take into account 
the total wealth produced during this period (gross domestic product from 
1996 to 2010 – at constant prices 2006), the value that society lost with 
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the total number of road accident victims is about 1% of the total wealth 
created.
Note that this value would have been higher if it were not for the down-
ward trend of total victims and therefore the value of lost production, since 
there was an absolute cumulative gain (no-loss) of about 982 million euros 
for society during the period considered.
7.1.2 – Value of lost production of fatal victims
The following chart illustrates the trend in the value of lost production of 
fatal victims from 1996 to 2010:
Graph 7.1.1.2
Value of lost production of fatalities
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 3).
With the exception of 1997 to 1998, 2001 to 2002 and 2006 to 2007, all 
other years revealed a decrease from year to year.
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In this context, the year that checked in with highest absolute value of 
lost production was 1996 with about 1.055 billion euros, contrariwise, 
the lowest absolute value was recorded in 2010 representing nearly 382 
million euros. If the value of loss of production were to be weighed in 1996, 
it would represent approximately 1% of GDP and about 0.2% in 2010.
Nevertheless, the total amount of production lost by society, over the 
time span reviewed, amounted to approximately 11.088 billion euros. If 
we were to take into account the sum of the gross domestic product from 
1996 to 2010 (at constant prices of 2006), the value that society lost due to 
road accident fatalities is about 0.5% of the total wealth generated during 
this period.
It is worth mentioning that this value would have been higher if it were 
not for the downward trend of fatalities and therefore the value of lost 
production, since there was an absolute cumulative gain (no-loss) of about 
673 million euros for society during the period considered.
In estimating the potential loss of production of fatal victims, we as-
sessed the median age of fatal road accident victims, using both the data 
provided by the ANSR regarding fatalities per age group and the average 
life expectancy in Portugal.
Fatalities weigh the most when it comes to the total cost of accidents in 
each year of the time-series analyzed (1996-2010). The variance rate in 
the number of fatalities throughout the period was constantly negative, 
except for 2002, 2007 and 2010. The cumulative variance rate in the period 
reviewed was - 97%, indicating a positive trend.
Similarly, the variance rate of costs related to the estimated lost production 
with fatalities was continuously negative, except for 1998, 2002 (which 
was zero) and 2007. The cumulative variance rate was - 93%.
The similarity between the two sets of variance rates indicates that there 
is high correlation between them, whereby the reduction of road fatalities 
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has an almost equal and proportional effect on the reduction of the costs 
of lost production.
In 1996, the estimated value of lost production relative to road fatalities 
was about 1.055 billion euros at 2006 constant prices, whereas at the end 
of the period this estimated value was nearly 381.8 million euros, i.e., 
2.76 times lower. Over the span of 15 years, the total estimated value of 
production loss referent to fatal road accident victims was about 11.088 
million euros.
7.1.3 – Value of lost production of seriously injured victims
The value of lost production of seriously injured victims is illustrated in the 
following graph and allows the reader to visualize the trend of this cost in 
the period analyzed herein:
Graph 7.1.1.3
Value of lost production of seriously injured victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 4).
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Except for the period between 2008 and 2010, all other years presented a 
decrease from year to year. The highest absolute value of lost production 
resulting from seriously injured victims was verified in 1996, nearly 397 
million euros, while on the other hand the lowest absolute value was 
recorded in 2008 representing a loss of about 96 million euros.
The value of lost production resulting from seriously injured victims, in 
1996, represented about 0.3% of GDP and in 2010 it represented about 0.1% 
of GDP, reflecting a steady decline all throughout the period.
Nevertheless, the total amount of production lost by society in respect 
to seriously injured victims, over the time span reviewed, amounted to 
approximately 3.039 billion euros. If we were to take into account the 
sum of the gross domestic product from 1996 to 2010 (at constant prices 
of 2006), the value that society lost due to seriously injured road accident 
victims is about 0.13% of the total wealth generated during this period.
We also draw attention to the fact that this value would have been higher 
if it were not for the downward trend of seriously injured victims and 
therefore the value of lost production, since there was an absolute cumula-
tive gain (no-loss) of about 297 million euros for society during the period 
considered.
7.1.4 – Value of lost production of slightly injured victims
Regarding the value of production loss of slightly injured victims, its 
progression is depicted in the graph below for the period 1996 - 2010:
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Graph 7.1.1.4
Value of lost production of slightly injured victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 5).
The decreasing slope was not as pronounced although it did reveal a 
downward trend. In this context, 1998 was the year with the highest 
absolute value of lost production checking in with cost of nearly 80.1 
million euros, whereas the lowest absolute value was recorded in 2008, 
representing roughly 57 million euros.
If in 1996 the value of lost production associated to road accident minor 
injury represented about 0.06% of GDP, it was about 0.04% in 2010. Still, 
the total amount of production lost by society, over the time span reviewed, 
amounted to approximately 1.026 billion euros. If we were to take into 
account the sum of the gross domestic product from 1996 to 2010 (at 
constant prices of 2006), the value that society lost due to slightly injured 
road accident victims is about 0.04% of the total wealth generated during 
this period.
Despite of the moderate decreasing slope in relation to other types of 
victims, this value would have been higher if it were not for the downward 
trend of slightly injured victims and therefore the value of lost production, 
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since there was an absolute cumulative gain (no-loss) of about 12 million 
euros for society during the period considered.
7.2 – Economic and social cost of road accidents
Since accidents with victims originate costs of various kinds, it is important 
to analyze the evolution of the total cost of accidents over the period 
considered. As noted earlier, the value of lost production caused by fatal, 
seriously and slightly injured accident victims revealed a downward trend, 
which was reflected in the total cost of accidents due to the importance 
that these categories represent in such total cost.
Graph 7.2.1
Evolution of the economic and social cost of road accidents
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 8).
The graph above allows us to take a glance at the trend of the economic 
and social cost of road accidents in Portugal during the period 1996 - 2010.
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Cost evolution displayed a decreasing trend although there were some 
years where the cost increased, in particular, from 2000 to 2001 and from 
2008 until 2009.
In this context, 1996 was the year with the highest absolute value, nearly 
3.086 billion euros, whereas the lowest absolute value was recorded in 
2008, representing roughly 1.870 billion euros.
In 1996 the amount of the economic and social cost of road accidents was 
nearly 2.41% of GDP and in 2010 it was about 1.17%. Nevertheless, the total 
cost for society, over the time span considered, amounted to approximately 
37.549 billion euros. If we were to take into account the sum of the gross 
domestic product from 1996 to 2010 (at constant prices of 2006), it would 
suggest that the value lost by society as a result of fatal victims was about 
1.64% of the total wealth generated during this period.
The annual value of the economic and social cost in the period considered 
would have been higher if it were not for the downward trend, since there 
was an absolute cumulative gain (no-loss) of about 1.196 billion euros for 
society.
Upon analysis of the time frame spanning from 1996 to 2010, we estimated 
that the annual average economic and social cost of road accidents in 
Portugal (including road fatality, serious and minor injury) was about 2.503 
billion euros.
Since we are studying the cost associated to road accidents in Portugal, 
it is imperative that we evaluate the different factors and elements that 
contribute to the value of the economic and social cost attained. Actually, 
the ontological aspect has a fundamental role in this matter. Despite of 
the assessment of monetary and non-monetary costs of road accidents 
being the core purpose of our present study, it should be pointed out, 
that it is upon people that accidents inflict more pain, suffering and often 
irreparable damage. Therefore, it becomes evident of how important it is 
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to know how these three types of accident victims contribute towards the 
economic and social cost borne by society.
In the chart below we can verify the evolution of the economic and social 
cost of road accidents with fatalities:
Chart 7.2.1
Evolution of the economic and social cost of road accidents with  
fatalities during the period 1996- 2010
Year
Average Annual Social Cost 
of Road Accidents with 
Fatal Victims (In Euros)
1996 1 250 197 239
1997 1 217 203 441
1998 1 233 072 090
1999 1 182 844 325
2000 1 114 833 343
2001 1 028 231 232
2002 1 030 999 221
2003 921 983 307
2004 791 785 522
2005 749 321 662
2006 553 188 798
2007 573 938 956
2008 509 705 841
2009 473 667 213
2010 462 951 908
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 17).
In reviewing the chart above, we found that the annual social cost of road 
accidents with fatalities plummeted in the period under review, except 
in 2007, implying a reduced impact of road fatality cost on the overall 
economic and social cost, which fell from roughly 41% in 1996 to about 
24% in 2010.
77VII – Empirical Study
Considering the time interval afore, the average annual economic and 
social cost of fatal road accidents in Portugal was about 873 million euros, 
which was strongly affected by the initial annual values of the period. In 
relative terms, the average cost of fatal accidents had an impact of about 
35% on the average overall economic and social cost.
Regarding the trend in economic and social cost of accidents with seriously 
injured victims, we present the illustrative chart below:
Chart 7.2.2
Evolution of the economic and social cost of road accidents with  
seriously injured victims during the period 1996- 2010
Year
Average Annual Social Cost of 
Road Accidents with Seriously 
Injured Victims (In Euros)
1996 921 518 835
1997 805 448 157
1998 717 551 494
1999 684 104 314
2000 632 885 172
2001 587 877 957
2002 485 916 347
2003 454 334 263
2004 416 032 370
2005 370 129 330
2006 352 794 520
2007 307 528 248
2008 262 474 940
2009 266 758 689
2010 268 060 232
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 18).
Based on the detailed information provided in the chart above, we verified 
that the annual social cost of road accidents with seriously injured victims 
fell all throughout the period, except during the last two years, suggesting 
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a reduced impact of minor injury cost on overall economic and social cost, 
which fell from roughly 30% in 1996 to about 14% in 2010.
During this time interval, the average annual economic and social cost of 
road accidents with seriously injured victims was approximately 502.2 mil-
lion euros. In relative terms, the average cost of road accidents involving 
serious injury had an impact of about 20% on the average overall economic 
and social cost.
In what pertains to minor injury accidents, the following chart gives an 
idea of its cost evolution:
Chart 7.2.3
Evolution of the economic and social cost of road accidents with  
slightly injured victims during the period 1996- 2010
Year
Average Annual Social Cost of 
Road Accidents with Slightly 
Injured Victims (In Euros)
1996 913 830 989
1997 942 829 823
1998 966 600 723
1999 972 265 583
2000 972 470 139
2001 1 400 638 069
2002 1 393 606 287
2003 1 293 475 203
2004 1 246 503 663
2005 1 188 900 916
2006 1 197 378 473
2007 1 018 774 998
2008 1 097 586 503
2009 1 157 998 863
2010 1 158 812 509
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 19).
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Contrary to what was verified in the case of fatal and serious injury ac-
cident cost we detected an infrequent and increasing trend in the cost of 
minor road accident injury during the period considered. Nevertheless, we 
found that its impact on overall economic and social cost, increased from 
about 30% in 1996 to about 61% in 2010, suggesting an increased impact 
of the said victims on overall accident cost in Portugal.
From 1996 to 2010, the average annual economic and social cost of road 
accidents with slightly injured victims was about 1.128 billion euros. In 
relative terms, the average cost of road accidents involving minor injury 
had an impact of about 45% on the average overall economic and social 
cost.
Thus, it appears that the average impact of the cost of accidents with 
minor injury is – per se – almost as high as the average impact of the cost 
of accidents with fatalities and serious injury combined.
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7.2.1 – Average cost per accident with victims
The trend in the average cost per accident with victims can be seen in the 
following graph:
Graph 7.2.1.1
Trend in the average economic and social cost per accident with victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 16).
We observe a decreasing trend from 1996 up until 1999 (except for a 
slight increase of about 40 euros during 1998 and 1999) rising from 1999 
to 2001, then falling again until 2007, increasing once more until 2008 and 
finally decreasing by the end of the period. There is evidence of a slight 
downward trend in the average value of cost per accident with victims in 
the period under review, in spite of the two recorded increases.
In this context, 2001 was the year with the highest absolute value, nearly 
71 thousand euros, whereas the lowest absolute value was recorded in 
2010, roughly 53.3 thousand euros. At the beginning of the period, the 
average cost per accident with victims was about 62.6 thousand euros and 
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by the end of that same period it was about 53.3 thousand euros, precisely 
the lowest absolute value.
The balance between gains and losses throughout the period, allowed us 
to conclude that the average value of cost per accident with victims had 
decreased by about 9.3 thousand euros, suggesting a downward trend in 
the unit value of economic and social cost per accident with victims.
Furthermore, if we were to conduct a variance analysis we would we find 
that during the period considered, the cumulative rate was negative and 
that it was approximately 14%, translating into an average of about 60.5 
thousand euros per accident with victims.
7.2.2 – Average cost per accident with fatalities
Let’s take a look at the trend illustrated in the graph below pertaining to 
the average cost per accident with fatalities for the period 1996-2010:
Graph 7.2.2.1
Trend in the average economic and social cost per accident with fatalities
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 12).
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This cost registered an increasing trend until 2001 having decreased from 
this year onward with some fluctuation, namely from 2003 to 2004 and 
from 2006 to 2007.
In this context, 1996 was the year with the lowest absolute value, nearly 
665 thousand euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded in 
2001, roughly 781.3 thousand euros. At the beginning of the period, the 
average cost per accident with fatalities was about 665 thousand euros and 
by the end of that same period it was about 687 thousand euros.
The balance between gains and losses in the period reviewed, allowed us to 
conclude that the cost value of each accident with fatalities had increased 
by about 21.9 thousand euros, suggesting an upward trend in the unit value 
of economic and social cost per accident with fatalities.
From the variance analysis, we obtained confirmation of an increasing cost 
per accident with fatalities in the period considered, having verified that 
the cumulative growth rate was positive and that it was approximately 
4%, translating into an average of about 735 thousand euros per accident 
with fatalities.
7.2.3 – Average cost per accident with seriously injured victims
The average cost per accident with seriously injured victims is portrayed 
in the following graph which allows us to visualize the evolution of this 
cost in the period analyzed herein:
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Graph 7.2.3.1
Trend in the average economic and social cost per accident with  
seriously injured victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 13).
The average cost to society of each accident with seriously injured victims 
during the period considered, reveals an overall growing trend, with a 
more accentuated growth period between 2000 and 2002, maintaining 
itself constant through the remainder of the period.
The growing trend of this cost did however register some fluctuation 
namely, from 2002 to 2003, from 2004 to 2005, from 2006 to 2008 and 
from 2009 to 2010, periods in which we witnessed a decline in the cost 
per accident with seriously injured victims, having presented – in all other 
years – an increase from year to year.
In this context, 1996 was the year with the lowest absolute value, nearly 
107.5 thousand euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded 
in 2002, roughly 133.4 thousand euros. At the beginning of the period, the 
cost per accident with seriously injured victims was about 107.5 thousand 
euros and by the end of that same period it was about 126 thousand euros.
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When we contemplate the balance between gains and losses in the time 
period viewed, the cost value of each accident with seriously injured 
victims had increased by about 18.5 thousand euros, suggesting an upward 
trend in the unit value of economic and social cost per accident with 
seriously injured victims.
From the variance analysis, we verified that the cumulative rate was 
positive and that it was approximately 17%, translating into an average 
of about 121.4 thousand euros per accident with seriously injured victims.
7.2.4 – Average cost per accident with slightly injured victims
The following graph provides the reader with an overview of the trend in 
the cost per accident with minor injuries during the period 1996 - 2010:
Graph 7.2.4.1
Trend in the average economic and social cost per accident with slightly injured victims
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 14).
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The average cost to society of each accident with slightly injured victims 
during the period considered, presented an overall growing trend, with a 
sharp growth period between 2000 and 200157, maintaining itself constant 
through the remainder of the period, except for 2006-2007, year in which 
it converged towards a value of nearly 35 thousand euros.
In this context, 1997 was the year with the lowest absolute value, nearly 
23.4 thousand euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded in 
2000, roughly 38 thousand euros. At the beginning of the period, the cost 
per accident with slightly injured victims was about 23.5 thousand euros 
and by the end of that same period it was about 35.5 thousand euros.
By conducting a balance between gains and losses in the period consid-
ered, we verified that the cost value of each accident with slightly injured 
victims had increased by about 12 thousand euros, suggesting an upward 
trend in the unit value of economic and social cost per accident with 
slightly injured victims.
From the variance analysis, we verified that the cumulative rate was 
positive and that it was approximately 52%, translating into an average of 
about 32 thousand euros per accident with slightly injured victims, strongly 
driven by growth verified between 2000 and 2001, whose variance rate 
was about 46%58.
57 Due to a strong growth in the value of costs relating to property damage to vehicles. 
Data provided by the Portuguese Insurance Institute (ISP).
58 Idem.
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7.3 – Average cost per fatal, seriously and slightly injured victim
The subsequent analysis estimates the average cost per victim by dividing 
the total cost of accidents by the number of total victims (which comprises 
fatal and injured victims) or by the average cost per fatality, per seriously 
injured victim and per slightly injured victim.
7.3.1 – Average cost per victim
The average cost per victim includes the cost of fatalities and the cost of 
seriously injured victims. The following graph allows the reader to view 
its evolution over the period 1996 - 2010.
Graph 7.3.1.1
Trend of the average cost per victim
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 15).
The average cost per victim declined from 1996 until 1999, rising from 
1999 to 2001, falling again until 2007 recording a subsequent increase 
until 2008, only to fall again at the end of the time period. Such evidence 
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reveals a downward trend in the average cost per victim, except for two 
instances in the time series where the opposite was verified.
In this context, 2001 was the year with the highest absolute value, nearly 
51.5 thousand euros, whereas the lowest absolute value was recorded in 
2010, roughly 40 thousand euros.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per victim was about 
44.9 thousand euros and by the end of that same period it was about 40 
thousand euros.
By conducting a balance between gains and losses in the period consid-
ered, we verified that the average cost per victim had decreased by about 
5 thousand euros, suggesting a downward trend in the unit value of the 
average economic and social cost per victim.
Furthermore, if we were to conduct a variance analysis we would we find 
that during the period above, the cumulative rate was negative and that it 
was approximately 9%, translating into an average of about 44.3 thousand 
euros per victim.
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7.3.2 – Average cost per fatality
The graph below depicts the evolution of the average cost per fatality 
during the period 1996 - 2010:
Graph 7.3.2.1
Trend of the average cost per fatality
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 9).
The average cost per fatality grew from 1996 up until 2002, year in which it 
began to display a downward trend, namely from 2002 to 2003, from 2004 
to 2006 and from 2007 until the end of the period, having only checked 
in with a slight increase during 2003 and 2004 and from 2006 to 200759. 
In this context, 1996 was the year with the lowest absolute value, nearly 
595.3 thousand euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded 
in 2002, roughly 702 thousand euros.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per fatality was about 
595.3 thousand euros and by the end of that same period it was about 
624.8 thousand euros. By conducting a balance between gains and losses 
59 This increase was the result of growth in the Portuguese GDP per capita.
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in the period considered, we verified that the average cost per fatality 
had increased by about 29.4 thousand euros, suggesting an upward trend 
in the unit value of the economic and social cost of accidents per fatality.
Furthermore, if we were to conduct a variance analysis we would we find 
that during the period above, the cumulative rate was positive and that it 
was approximately 6%, translating into an average of about 663.8 thousand 
euros per fatality.
7.3.3 – Average cost per seriously injured victim
The following graph shows the evolution in the cost per seriously injured 
victim during the period 1996 - 2010.
Graph 7.3.3.1
Trend of the average cost per seriously injured victim
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 10).
According to official data provided by the Portuguese Insurance Institute 
(ISP); there was a noticeable “leap” from period between 2000 and 2001.
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In spite of drops recorded from 2002 to 2003, from 2004 to 2005, from 2006 
to 2007 and from 2009 to 2010 (in about 8 euros), the overall increasing 
trend was evident. The lowest absolute value was witnessed in 1996, nearly 
85 thousand euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded in 
2002, roughly 101.9 thousand euros.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per seriously injured victim 
was about 85 thousand euros and by the end of that same period it was 
about 101.6 thousand euros. By the assessment of gains and losses in the 
period considered, we verified that the average cost per seriously injured 
victim had increased by about 16.6 thousand euros, suggesting an upward 
trend in the unit value of the average economic and social cost of accidents 
per seriously injured victim.
Further, if we were to conduct a variance analysis we would we find that 
during the period above, the cumulative rate was positive and that it was 
approximately 19%, translating into an average of about 96.1 thousand 
euros per seriously injured victim.
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7.3.4 – Average cost per slightly injured victim
Cost per slightly injured victim during the period between 1996 and 2010 
has been summarized in the line graph below.
Graph 7.3.4.1
Trend of the average cost per slightly injured victim
Elaborated by the author (See Appendix 11).
As seen above there was a “leap” from 2000 to 2001. Although with some 
fluctuation, the value of the average cost of accidents per slightly injured 
victim remained relatively stable at around the threshold of 25 thousand 
euros, registering some lows between the periods from 2001 to 2003, from 
2006 to 2007, and from 2008 until the end of the time frame. In this context, 
1996 was the year with the lowest absolute value, nearly 16.4 thousand 
euros, whereas the highest absolute value was recorded in 2006, roughly 
27.4 thousand euros.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per slightly injured victim 
was about 16.4 thousand euros and by the end of that same period it was 
about 26.4 thousand euros. In the assessment of gains and losses in the 
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period considered, we verified that the average cost per slightly injured 
victim had increased by about 10 thousand euros, suggesting an upward 
trend in the unit value of the economic and social cost of accidents per 
slightly injured victim.
From the variance analysis, we verified that the cumulative rate was 
positive and that it was approximately 59%, translating into an average 
of about 23.1 thousand euros per slightly injured victim.
7.4 – Econometric Analysis
The purpose of this section is to analyze some of the determinants of 
the total number of road accident casualties – deaths, serious and minor 
injuries – and to assess not only the efficacy of these explicative variables 
but also the effectiveness of road regulation reforms in Portugal over the 
period between 1988 and 2010.
7.4.1 – Data and explicative variables
In each econometric model the dependent variable shall be the total 
number of casualties – deaths, serious and minor injuries – whereas the 
corresponding realizations of the time-series shall contain 270 monthly 
observations.
The explanatory variables60 shall be:
a) Time-series realizations (with 270 monthly observations):
• GAS – road transport fuel consumption as a proxy of the time 
of exposure to risk;
60 The data relative to these time-series were provided by the ANSR.
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• Y-1 – lagged dependent variable;
• X-1 – LnGAS – lagged;
• HWY – number of motorway kilometers (SHWy) as structural 
change relative to physical driving environment61. Roads and 
highways are variables that relate to the physical driving 
environment and are one of the factors leading to accidents, 
combined with human factors, vehicle factors and economic 
variables.
b) Dummy variables pertaining to the reforms made to the Highway 
Code (HC) which translate into incentives aimed at the behavior 
of drivers and other road users so as to increase driving care and 
minimize social costs. These qualitative variables (found in the 
models) are as follows:
• CRIMEALC (D1) – dummy variable that represents rules of 
criminal law referent to the criminal offense of DWI (driving 
while intoxicated), whose impact is verified prior to an ac-
cident (ex-ante). It has a value of 1 starting from the second 
quarter of 1991 onwards and has the value of 0 for all other 
periods;
• SL50Km (D2) – dummy variable that stands for reforms made 
to the Highway Code HC, namely, those that enforced a reduc-
tion in the speed limit within urban areas (50 kph), with a 
value of 1 starting from june 1994 onwards and a value of 0 
for all other periods;
• CHILDDEV (D3) – dummy variable representing reforms 
made to the Highway Code HC regarding the mandatory use 
61 We did not consider the number of kilometers of roads in the models due to unavailable 
data.
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of child safety vehicle restraints, with a value of 1 starting 
from july 1995 onwards and a value of 0 for all other periods;
• INCRSANCTIP (D4) – dummy variable that symbolizes re-
forms made to the Highway Code HC regarding increased 
monetary sanctions and mandatory immediate payment of 
traffic offenses;
• ZT (D5) – “Zero Tolerance”; dummy variable which stands for 
the strict law enforcement on certain stretches of roads, with 
a value of 1 starting from the third quarter of 1998 onwards 
and with a value of 0 for all other periods.
c) The models also contain a dummy variable that represents the 
structural change referent to the current economic and social 
crisis verified in Portugal:
• CRISIS (D6) – dummy variable (structural change) represent-
ing the economic and social crisis witnessed in Portugal since 
2007, with a value of 1 starting from january 2007 onwards 
and with a value of 0 for all other periods.
7.4.2 – Time-series tests performed
To obtain the functional form of our econometric modeling, we used the 
J. MacKinnon, H. White and R. Davidson test (MWD), having concluded 
that the log-linear functional form is the most adequate form of linear 
regression because it is the best at portraying the relationships between 
the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, reason for which 
we used the log-linear form in our econometric analyses.
To verify trend and seasonality in time-series we used the Ljung-Box tests. 
Our findings pointed towards seasonality in the time-series. We conducted 
a seasonal-trend decomposition of the time-series through the Census II 
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method which gave us adjusted time-series. The seasonal adjustment of 
the time-series indicated that the first differences remove non-stationarity 
of the adjusted series, which are integrals of order (1).
The time-series of first differences are apparently stationary, I (0). For this 
purpose we performed the Dickey-Fuller62 tests which corroborated our 
finding. We also carried out the co-integration Engle-Granger tests whose 
results indicated that the series were co-integrated.
Since non-equilibrium is present in many economic processes, dynamic 
models – with some metric variable lags – allow for the adjustment of non-
equilibrium. Introducing lagged variables is statistically correct because it 
assists in avoiding omitted variable bias which results from the incorrect 
exclusion of dynamic processes of adjustment and from the dismissal of 
individual behavior outside equilibrium. Therefore, dynamic autoregres-
sive distributed lag models (ADL) were estimated.
62 Cf. Dickey (1979).
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7.4.3 – Econometric models pertaining to the total number of road 
accident victims (Fatal, Seriously and Slightly Injured)
The purpose of this section is to analyze which factors influence the total 
number of victims – deaths, serious and minor injuries.
7.4.3.1 – Total victims
The following chart displays two econometric models estimated for the 
total number of victims involved in road accidents:
Chart 7.4.3.1.1
Dynamic ADL models (1,1). Regression results.
Dependent Variable/Regressand: Ln TOTAL VICTIMSt
LnTOTAL 
VICTIMS
(Con­
stant)
LagLn­
TVICT
LnGAS 
(X1)
LAG­
(lnGAS 
(X­1)
LnHWY 
(X2)
CRIME­
ALC 
(D1)
SL50Km 
(D2)
CHILD­
DEV 
(D3)
INCR­
SANCIP 
(D4)
TZ 
(D5)
CRISIS 
(D6)
MODEL A Coef -1.152 0.612 0.772 -0.257 -1.159 0.109 -0.014 -0.021 -0.045 -0.067 0.016
Log-linear se 0.976 0.047 0.074 0.085 0.315 0.037 0.032 0.029 0.022 0.026 0.020
N=276 Beta   0.611 0.985 -0.331 -0.642 0.159 -0.034 -0.053 -0.114 -0.175 0.032
  t -1.180 12.931 10.429 -3.015 -3.685 2.954 -0.441 -0.729 -2.066 -2.548 0.822
  pv 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.659 0.467 0.040 0.011 0.412
                         
MODEL B Coef -0.231 0.614 0.738 -0.294 -1.192 0.114     -0.033 -0.060  
Log-linear se 0.667 0.047 0.070 0.081 0.246 0.033     0.019 0.024  
N=276 Beta   0.614 0.942 -0.378 -0.660 0.166     -0.082 -0.156  
  t -0.346 13.101 10.601 -3.631 -4.852 3.493     -1.824 -2.521  
  pv 0.729 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001     0.086 0.012  
  R2 R2a RSS F SE DW
MODEL A 0.821 0.815 1.775 121.488 0.08199 2.047
MODEL B 0.820 0.815 1.788 174.005 0.08182 2.047
Source: Based on ANSR data.
Overall, Model B is the best specified model in view of the F statistic’s 
value.
97VII – Empirical Study
The results of the dynamic models indicate that the variable representing 
road transport fuel consumption is significant and that its coefficient of 
linear regression is positive, indicating that, as a proxy for risk exposure, 
it contributes towards explaining the variation in the number of accidents.
We also found that highways (HWY) contribute towards reducing the 
total victim toll – given that it (variable) was also significant and its partial 
regression coefficient was negative. Highways are deemed as safer roads 
because they reduce the risk of accidents and their effects.
As for the variable that represents the criminal offense of DWI (driving 
while intoxicated), there is evidence that the change in the corresponding 
legal sanction had no effect on driver behavior. This variable is significant. 
Nonetheless its linear regression coefficient is positive, contrary, to what 
would been expected. This is an indication of a rigid demand for these 
types of traffic offenses by drivers who usually drive with BAC levels 
greater than or equal to 1.2 g/l.
Studies in the field of behavioral economics63 and neuroeconomics have 
shown that drugs – namely alcohol – reduce risk perception64 and con-
sequently make individuals more risk-seeking65 when compared to the 
average person66, resulting in more accidents.
Increased risk as a result of driving impairment may be compensated with 
a higher probability of law enforcement – so that effective probability is 
greater than threshold probability – which may occur with a higher level 
of enforcement and apprehension.
63 Cf. Nestler (2004); Paulus (2007); Shermer (2008).
64 Peterson (2007), p. 67.
65 Cf. Lane (2004); Elder (2004).
66 Cf. Camerer (1989).
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If the probability of law enforcement would increase, (provided that 
exceeds the threshold probability) self compliance is likely to be internal-
ized in the individual, reducing the risk of accidents.
Further, the dummy variable that represents zero tolerance enforcement 
was also significant and had a negative linear regression coefficient, point-
ing to the assumption that the increased probability of law enforcement 
had a decisive impact on reducing accidents.
The dummy variable that represents reforms made to the Highway Code 
HC regarding increased monetary sanctions and mandatory immediate 
payment of traffic offenses was also significant and checked in with a 
negative linear regression coefficient. This means that immediate payment 
of traffic offenses generates higher probability of law enforcement, making 
it an effective policy measure.
In contrast, the dummy variable pertaining to the reform made to the 
Highway Code regarding the reduction of the speed limit in urban areas 
to 50 kph, was insignificant, suggesting that law enforcement in regards 
to this variable revealed a low expected sanction.
The dummy variable referent to mandatory use of child vehicle restraints 
was also not significant.
We also verified that the economic crisis, portrayed by the dummy variable 
CRISIS (D6) – which is a structural change endured since 2007 – was not 
statistically significant. Apparently, this is evidence that this structural 
change does not explain the trend in the total number of accident victims 
during the period in question.
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7.4.3.2 – Econometric models concerning fatalities
The following chart presents two econometric models with regard to 
fatalities:
Chart 7.4.3.2.1
Dynamic ADL models (1,1). Regression results.
Dependent Variable/Regressand: Ln FATALITIESt
LnFATALITIES
(Con­
stant)
LagLn­
FATALITIES 
(Y­1)
LnGAS 
(X1)
LAG­
(lnGAS 
(X­1)
LnHWY 
(X2)
CRIME­
ALC 
(D1)
SL50Km 
(D2)
CHILD­
DEV 
(D3)
INCR­
SANCIP 
(D4)
TZ 
(D5)
CRISIS 
(D6)
MODEL A Coef 0.023 0.002 0.744 0.095 -3.324 0.230 0.052 -0.026 -0.179 -0.111 -0.163
Log-linear se 1.774 0.000 0.134 0.145 0.599 0.066 0.058 0.054 0.039 0.047 0.036
N=276 Beta   0.286 0.410 0.053 -0.795 0.144 0.053 -0.027 -0.194 -0.125 -0.141
  t 0.013 5.485 5.536 0.653 -5.548 3.469 0.899 -0.478 -4.592 -2.364 -4.585
  pv 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.001 0.369 0.633 0.000 0.019 0.000
                         
MODEL B Coef 0.024 0.002 0.782   -2.926 0.200     -0.192 -0.121 -0.173
Log-linear se 1.115 0.000 0.122   0.430 0.057     0.035 0.042 0.034
N=276 Beta   0.297 0.431   -0.700 0.126     -0.208 -0.136 -0.149
  t 0.021 6.170 6.427   -6.811 3.536     -5.553 -2.905 -5.020
  pv 0.983 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000     0.000 0.004 0.000
  R2 R2a RSS F SE DW
MODEL A 0.890 0.886 5.847 214.254 0.14882 1.895
MODEL B 0.890 0.887 5.876 307.828 0.14835 1.895
Source: Based on ANSR data.
The models display global significance. Model B continues to be the better 
specified model.
As in the previous subsection, the variable representing the number of 
motorway kilometers was significant and its partial regression coefficient 
was negative, indicating that these roads contribute towards reducing the 
number of fatalities.
As for the variable that represents the criminal offense of DWI (driving 
while intoxicated), it did reveal significance, however its linear regression 
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coefficient67 was positive, contrary, to what would have been expected. 
This is an indication of a rigid demand for these types of traffic offenses 
by drivers who usually drive with BAC levels greater than or equal to 1.2 
g/l. For further explanation, see what was said regarding the models on 
total victims.
The dummy variables pertaining to the mandatory use of child vehicle 
restraints and the reduction of the speed limit in urban areas to 50 kph, are 
insignificant in explaining variation in the number of fatalities.
The dummy variable that represents reforms made to the Highway Code 
HC regarding increased monetary sanctions and mandatory immediate 
payment of traffic offenses was also significant and checked in with a 
negative linear regression coefficient. This means that the immediate 
payment of traffic offenses, when identified by police authorities, is an 
effective policy measure that increases the probability of law enforcement 
and contributes towards reducing the road fatality toll.
Similarly, the dummy variable that represents zero tolerance enforcement 
was also significant and had a negative linear regression coefficient, point-
ing to the assumption that the increased probability of law enforcement 
had a decisive impact on reducing accidents.
As for the dummy variable that represents the economic and social crisis 
endured in recent years (structural change), it did reveal significance and 
its coefficient of linear regression was negative, indicating that it may have 
had some effects and can help in explaining the decrease in the number 
of fatalities.
67 Standardized linear regression coefficients can be observed, interpreted and rescaled.
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7.4.3.3 – Econometric models concerning serious injury
The estimated results regarding seriously injured victims are presented 
below:
Chart 7.4.3.3.1
Dynamic ADL models (1,1). Regression results.
Dependent Variable/Regressand: Ln SERIOUSLy INjUREDt
LnSERIOUSLY 
INJURED
(Con­
stant)
LagLn­
SERIN­
JVIC
LnGAS 
(X1)
LAG­
(lnGAS 
(X­1)
LnHWY 
(X2)
CRIME­
ALC 
(D1)
SL50Km 
(D2)
CHILD­
DEV 
(D3)
INCR­
SANCIP 
(D4)
TZ 
(D5)
CRISIS 
(D6)
MODEL A Coef 3.206 0.643 0.726 -0.484 -2.180 0.185 0.091 -0.019 -0.104 -0.056 -0.116
Log-linear se 1.434 0.046 0.107 0.112 0.474 0.052 0.044 0.042 0.033 0.027 0.036
N=276 Beta   0.641 0.299 -0.201 -0.390 0.087 0.069 -0.015 -0.084 -0.045 -0.075
  t 2.236 14.041 6.781 -4.332 -4.604 3.544 2.049 -0.454 -3.103 -2.044 -3.190
  pv 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.650 0.002 0.042 0.002
                         
MODEL B Coef 3.455 0.643 0.718 -0.492 -2.202 0.188 0.084   -0.102 -0.056 -0.117
Log-linear se 1.323 0.046 0.105 0.110 0.470 0.052 0.041   0.033 0.027 0.036
N=276 Beta   0.641 0.296 -0.204 -0.394 0.089 0.064   -0.082 -0.045 -0.075
  t 2.611 14.059 6.810 -4.480 -4.681 3.658 2.023   -3.076 -2.061 -3.223
  pv 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044   0.002 0.040 0.001
  R2 R2a RSS F SE DW
MODEL A 0.962 0.961 3.596 673.795 0.11672 2.272
MODEL B 0.962 0.961 3.599 750.888 0.11654 2.272
Source: Based on ANSR data.
The models display global significance. Model B remains the best specified 
model.
As in previous models, the variable representing the number of motorway 
kilometers was significant and its partial regression coefficient was nega-
tive, indicating that these roads contribute towards reducing the number 
of seriously injured victims, in the same fashion as fatalities.
As for the variable that represents the criminal offense of DWI (driving 
while intoxicated), it did reveal significance, however its linear regression 
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coefficient was positive, contrary, to what would have been expected. 
This is an indication of a rigid demand for these types of traffic offenses 
by drivers who usually drive with BAC levels greater than or equal to 1.2 
g/l. For further explanation, see what was said regarding the models on 
total victims.
Despite being significant, the dummy variables pertaining to the manda-
tory use of child vehicle restraints and the reduction of the speed limit 
in urban areas to 50 kph, checked in with positive linear regression coef-
ficients, suggesting that they are not effective policy measures and do not 
determine the number of seriously injured victims.
just as in the models pertaining to fatalities, the dummy variable that 
represents reforms made to the Highway Code HC regarding increased 
monetary sanctions and mandatory immediate payment of traffic offenses 
together with the dummies that embody zero tolerance enforcement and 
the economic and social crisis (structural change), were all significant and 
their partial regression coefficients were all negative. This implies that 
road policy measures that increase the probability of law enforcement are 
all effective.
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7.4.3.4 – Econometric models concerning minor injury
The following chart depicts the two estimated econometric models with 
regard to slightly injured victims:
Chart 7.4.3.4.1
Dynamic ADL models (1,1). Regression results.
Dependent Variable/Regressand: Ln SLIGHTLy INjUREDt
LnSLIGHTLY 
INJURED
(Con­
stant)
LagLn­
SLIGH­
INVIC
LnGAS 
(X1)
LAG­
(lnGAS 
(X­1)
LnHWY 
(X2)
CRIME­
ALC 
(D1)
SL50Km 
(D2)
CHILD­
DEV 
(D3)
INCR­
SANCIP 
(D4)
TZ 
(D5)
CRISIS 
(D6)
MODEL A Coef -2.003 0.602 0.794 -0.231 -1.039 0.110 -0.027 -0.021 -0.041 -0.062 0.025
Log-linear se 0.998 0.048 0.076 0.088 0.316 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.022 0.027 0.020
N=276 Beta   0.604 1.221 -0.357 -0.693 0.193 -0.077 -0.063 -0.125 -0.194 0.061
  t -2.008 12.679 10.503 -2.625 -3.291 2.926 -0.818 -0.704 -1.854 -2.317 1.270
  pv 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.414 0.482 0.065 0.021 0.205
                         
MODEL B Coef -0.871 0.626 0.763 -0.282 -1.203 0.127       -0.049  
Log-linear se 0.665 0.046 0.070 0.083 0.211 0.031       0.024  
N=276 Beta   0.627 1.174 -0.437 -0.803 0.224       -0.153  
  t -1.310 13.745 10.936 -3.414 -5.691 4.100       -2.030  
  pv 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000       0.043  
  R2 R2a RSS F SE DW
MODEL A 0.730 0.720 1.849 71.283 0.08369 2.048
MODEL B 0.725 0.718 1.885 117.505 0.08386 2.048
Source: Based on ANSR data.
The models display global significance. Model B remains the best specified 
model.
In this model, the variable representing the number of motorway kilome-
ters was significant – as in all other models analyzed – and continues to be 
an important factor in reducing the number of minor injury and accidents.
Likewise, the dummy variable zero tolerance was significant, with a nega-
tive linear regression coefficient, suggesting, as in all other models, that 
increased probability of law enforcement is effective.
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In contrast, the variables that represent reforms made to the Highway 
Code HC regarding increased fines and mandatory immediate payment 
of traffic offenses, mandatory use of child vehicle restraints, the reduction 
of the speed limit in urban areas to 50 kph and the economic and social 
crisis, were all insignificant.
7.4.4 – Analysis of covariance for independent sets of variables
Covariance analysis aims to assess the strength or degree of each inde-
pendent variable (IV) or sets of variables, in explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable / regressand (DV) and represented as y in each model.
In this analysis we considered two Sets/Groups of explanatory variables, 
A and B, and we partialled out (i.e. kept constant or statistically controlled) 
the effects of the variables contained in Set A upon the variance of the 
regressand – in each model – in order to determine which part of the 
dependent variable’s variance is only explained by Set B’s independent 
variables. Set B is a research factor whose variance in the dependent 
variable is assumed to be zero because of the null hypothesis.
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7.4.4.1 – Covariance analysis of the total number of victims
Let’s take an in-depth look into the covariance analysis of the explained 
variable (total number of victims):
Chart 7.4.4.1.1
Covariance analysis of independent sets of variables – Total number of Victims
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g )
TESTS SET B KB SET A KA R2.AB R2.A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 4
y-1, X1, X-1, D1, 
D2, D3
6 0.830 0.78
2 D4, D5, D6 3
y-1, X1, X-1, X2, 
D1, D2, D3
7 0.830 0.82
TESTS SET B R2(AB­A)
ERROR Source of error
F Test
1­R2AB gl (kB) df (n­kA­kB­1)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 0.05 0.17 4 265 168.149
2 D4, D5, D6 0.02 0.17 3 265 168.149
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Partial Correlation (pR2B)
pR2B = (R2AB ­ R2A)/( 1­R2AB)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.29
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.09
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Semi Partial Correlation (sR2B)
sR2B = R2AB ­ R2A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.05
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.02
Source: Based on ANSR data.
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KEY (applied in all models):
• Y – dependent variable (regressand) in each model;
• Y-1 – lagged dependent variable;
• X1 – LnGAS – road transport fuel consumption as a proxy of the 
time of exposure to risk (in logs);
• X-1 – LnGAS – lagged;
• X2 – LnHWY – number of motorway kilometers (in logs);
• D1 – CRIMEALC – dummy variable that represents rules of 
criminal law referent to the criminal offense of DWI (driving 
while intoxicated);
• D2 – SL50Km – dummy variable that stands for reforms made to 
the Highway Code HC, namely, those that enforced a reduction 
in the speed limit within urban areas (50 kph);
• D3 – CHILDDEV – dummy variable representing reforms made 
to the Highway Code HC regarding the mandatory use of child 
safety vehicle restraints,;
• D4 – INCRSANCTIP – dummy variable that symbolizes reforms 
made to the Highway Code HC regarding increased monetary 
sanctions and mandatory immediate payment of traffic offenses;
• D5 – ZT – “Zero Tolerance”; dummy variable which stands for the 
strict law enforcement on certain stretches of roads,
• D6 – CRISIS – dummy variable (structural change) representing 
the economic and social crisis witnessed in Portugal since 2007.
Is it should be pointed out that each of the independent variable Sets, A 
and B, co-vary with y but also between themselves.
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The decision to include the explanatory variables, X2, D4, D5, in Set B, was 
based on our belief that such factors have a positive impact in reducing 
the number of accident victims. The two dummy variables, D4 and D5, are 
summed up as policies that result in increased probability of law enforce-
ment which, according to recent studies68, have been proven to be effective 
and are consistent with the theory of threshold probability.
just as the econometric models pointed out, the variables referent to the 
maximum speed limit of 50 kph in urban areas (D2), the mandatory use of 
child vehicle restraints (D3) and the variable that represents the economic 
crisis (D6) do not display significance and do not provide any explanation 
of variance in the number of total accident victims69 (explained variable, 
y).
As observed in test 1, Set A (partialled) comprised of six independent 
variables – predictors (Y-1, X1, X-1, D1, D2, D3,) is responsible for 78% of the 
variance in the number of total accident victims.
The further increment in explained variance caused by the independent 
variables (predictors) – X2, D4, D5, D6 contained in Set B is 5%, as shown in 
the chart above (square of semi partial correlation. The variance that exists 
between the variables of Set B and Set A was removed, maintaining the 
explained variable constant. Only Set B is residualized. The square of the 
semi partial correlation can be interpreted as the proportion or percentage 
of the criterion variance – dependent variable (total victims) associated 
uniquely with Set B (predictor).
However, Set B with its explanatory variables, is responsible for 29% of 
the variance in the total number of accident victims, unexplained by the 
other variables in the models, as shown in the chart above (square of 
partial correlation). The portion of variance associated between Set B and 
Set A and/or between y and Set A, was removed, contrary to semi partial 
68 Cf. Donário (2010a).
69 Some of the tests conducted are not explained in the text.
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correlation. With this, we are able to explain part of the variance in total 
victims that is not explained by the variables of Set A.
In test 2 we included only three dummy variables in Set B, D4, D5 and D6. 
The square of the semi partial correlation is 2% and the square of partial 
correlation is 9%, revealing the importance of law enforcement.
7.4.4.2 – Covariance analysis of the number of fatalities
In the following chart we can observe the results of the covariance analysis 
with respect to fatalities:
Chart 7.4.4.2.1
Covariance analysis of independent sets of variables – Fatalities
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g )
TESTS SET B KB SET A KA R2.AB R2.A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 4
y-1, X1, X-1, D1, 
D2, D3
6 0.890 0.800
2 D4, D5, D6 3
y-1, X1, X-1, X2, 
D1, D2, D3
7 0.890 0.870
TESTS SET B R2(AB­A)
ERROR Source of error
F Test
1­R2AB gl (kB) df (n­kA­kB­1)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 0.090 0.110 4 265 384.24
2 D4, D5, D6 0.020 0.110 3 265 447.00
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Partial Correlation (pR2B)
pR2B = (R2AB ­ R2A)/( 1­R2AB)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.82
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.18
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Semi Partial Correlation (sR2B)
sR2B = R2AB ­ R2A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.090
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.020
Source: Based on ANSR data.
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In the models relative to road accident fatalities, we included three dummy 
variables in Set B and in tests 1 and 2. Note, the variable that represents 
CRISIS (D6) is significant in explaining the variation in the number of 
fatalities.
just as the econometric models pointed out, road safety policy measures 
such as those pertaining to the maximum speed limit of 50 kph in urban 
areas (D2) and the mandatory use of child vehicle restraints (D3) did not 
prove to be significant and do not provide any explanation of variance in 
the number of fatalities.
As observed in test 1, Set A (partialled) comprised of six independent 
variables – predictors (Y-1, X1, X-1, D1, D2, D3) is responsible for 80% of the 
variance in the number of fatalities. The further increment of the variance 
uniquely explained by the independent variables (predictors) – X2, D4, D5, 
D6 contained in Set B is 9%, as shown in the chart above (square of semi 
partial correlation). In turn, the square of partial correlation is 82% of the 
variance in the number of fatalities which is not explained by other the 
variables of the models.
7.4.4.3 – Covariance analysis of the number of seriously injured 
victims
In the following chart we can observe the results of the covariance analysis 
with respect to seriously injured victims:
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Chart 7.4.4.3.1
Covariance analysis of independent sets of variables – Seriously Injured
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g )
TESTS SET B KB SET A KA R2.AB R2.A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 4
y-1, X1, X-1, D1, 
D2, D3
6 0.963 0.950
2 D4, D5, D6 3
y-1, X1, X-1, X2, 
D1, D2, D3
7 0.963 0.960
TESTS SET B R2(AB­A)
ERROR Source of error
F Test
1­R2AB gl (kB) df (n­kA­kB­1)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 0.013 0.037 4 265 869.238
2 D4, D5, D6 0.003 0.037 3 265 971.372
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Partial Correlation (pR2B)
pR2B = (R2AB ­ R2A)/( 1­R2AB)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.351
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.081
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Semi Partial Correlation (sR2B)
sR2B = R2AB ­ R2A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.013
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.003
Source: Based on ANSR data.
As observed in test 1, Set A (partialled) comprised of six independent 
variables – predictors (Y-1, X1, X-1, D1, D2, D3) is responsible for 95% of the 
variance in the number of seriously injured victims. The further increment 
of the variance uniquely explained by the independent variables (predic-
tors) – X2, D4, D5 and D6 contained in Set B is 1.3%, as shown in the chart 
above (square of semi partial correlation). In turn, the square of partial 
correlation is 35.1% of the variance in the number of seriously injured 
victims which is not explained by other the variables of the models.
In test 2, the results reveal that the square of semi partial correlation is 0.3% 
and the square of partial correlation is 8.1%, suggesting that the variables 
related to higher monetary fines and mandatory immediate payment of 
traffic offenses (D4), “Zero Tolerance” (D5) and CRISIS (D6), have contributed 
towards reducing the number of seriously injured victims.
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7.4.4.4 – Covariance analysis of the number of slightly injured 
victims
In the following chart we can observe the results of the covariance analysis 
with respect to slightly injured victims:
Chart 7.4.4.4.1
Covariance analysis of independent sets of variables – Slightly Injured
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g )
TESTS SET B KB SET A KA R2.AB R2.A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 4
y-1, X1, X-1, D1, 
D2, D3
6 0.730 0.683
2 D4, D5, D6 3
y-1, X1, X-1, X2, 
D1, D2, D3
7 0.730 0.720
TESTS SET B R2(AB­A)
ERROR Source of error
F Test
1­R2AB gl (kB) df (n­kA­kB­1)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 0.047 0.270 4 265 37.349
2 D4, D5, D6 0.010 0.27 3 265 41.575
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Partial Correlation (pR2B)
pR2B = (R2AB ­ R2A)/( 1­R2AB)
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.174
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.037
TESTS SET B
F0,05­critical 
value
F0,01­critical 
value
Square of Semi Partial Correlation (sR2B)
sR2B = R2AB ­ R2A
1 X2, D4, D5, D6 2.4 3.38 0.047
2 D4, D5, D6 2.64 3.85 0.010
Source: Based on ANSR data.
As observed in test 1, Set A (partialled) comprised of six independent 
variables – predictors (Y-1, X1, X-1, D1, D2, D3) is responsible for 68.3% of the 
variance in the number of slightly injured victims. The further increment of 
the variance uniquely explained by the independent variables (predictors) 
– X2, D4, D5 and D6 contained in Set B is 4.7%, as shown in the chart above 
(square of semi partial correlation). In turn, the square of partial correlation 
The Economic and Social Cost of Road Accidents in Portugal112
is 17.4% of the variance in the number of slightly injured victims which is 
not explained by other the variables of the models.
In test 2, the results reveal that the square of semi partial correlation is 1 % 
and the square of partial correlation is 3.7%, suggesting that the variables 
related to higher monetary fines and mandatory immediate payment of 
traffic offenses (D4), “Zero Tolerance” (D5) and CRISIS (D6), have contributed 
towards reducing the number of slightly injured victims.
VIII 
Conclusions
It is estimated that from 1996 to 2010 there was an average annual loss 
of production in respect to all road accident victims of about 1.010 billion 
euros, adding up to approximately 15.153 billion euros which represents 
nearly 40 % of the economic and social cost of road accidents in Portugal 
in the period analyzed.
8.1 – General Findings
In what pertains to monetary costs (insurer administrative costs, road 
safety costs, court operating costs, hospital costs, victim transport costs, 
law enforcement costs, property damages to vehicles, loss adjustment 
costs, attorney fees, court costs, funeral expenses – direct and indirect) 
relative to road accidents, it is estimated that the average annual cost was 
approximately 1.245 billion euros.
The overall value of this cost in the period examined, amounts to approxi-
mately 18.683 billion euros, which stands for nearly 50% of the economic 
and social cost of road accidents in the period analyzed.
As for non-monetary costs (moral damages) relating to road accidents in 
the period reviewed, we estimate that the average annual value was about 
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247.5 million euros. The overall value of this cost in the period analyzed, 
amounts to about 3.712 billion which represents about 10% of the economic 
and social cost of road accidents in Portugal from 1996 to 2010.
Given that the economic and social cost of road accidents is an aggregate 
of the components aforementioned, its total value was roughly 37.549 
billion euros between 1996 and 2010, representing nearly 1.64% of total 
production in Portugal over the fifteen years considered. In this context, 
we estimate an average annual economic and social cost of road accidents 
in Portugal of about 2.503 billion euros.
Of these 2.503 billion euros, nearly 35% was attributable to fatal road 
accidents, 20% to serious injury road accidents and the remaining 45% to 
minor injury road accidents.
Considering the average value of the economic and social cost of road 
accidents in Portugal for the period under review and bearing in mind; 
1) that in 2010 the Portuguese gross domestic product at constant prices 
of 2006 was approximately 162.033 billion euros and 2) that the average 
economic and social cost of road accidents estimated in 2010 was about 
1.890 billion euros, we conjecture that in 2010, the average economic 
and social cost ranges from about 1.17% to 1.54% of the Portuguese gross 
domestic product at constant prices of 2006.
In addition to the value of the average economic and social cost of road 
accidents in Portugal – considered as a whole – we depicted the average 
individual cost according to the different categories of victims:
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Chart 8.1.1
Average individual cost according to the different categories of victims
 
Period 1996 ­ 2010  
(Values in Euros)
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
of Road Accidents in Portugal
2 503 267 447
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Casualties (Deaths and Injuries)
44 292
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Fatality
663 826
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Seriously Injured Victims
96 126
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Slightly Injured Victims
23 135
Our estimates are based on the records provided by ANSR, ECB PORDATA,  
PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, GNR, PSP and ITIj.
As stated above, the average economic and social cost of road accidents in 
Portugal was about 2.503 billion euros, at constant prices of 2006.
By analyzing the average economic and social cost per casualty (deaths 
and injuries) we verified that it is approximately 44.3 thousand euros in 
the period under consideration.
When we compare the different categories of victims the values are quite 
different, namely, the average economic and social cost per fatality as-
cended to around 663.8 thousand euros in the period under review.
For serious injuries, the average economic and social cost for each seri-
ously injured victim was roughly 96.1 thousand euros.
With respect to minor injuries, the average economic and social cost for 
each slightly injured victim is about 23.1 thousand euros.
The following chart depicts the values  for the different average individual 
costs for accidents with victims:
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Chart 8.1.2
Average individual cost per accident with casualties
 
Period 1996 ­ 2010  
(Values in Euros)
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
of Road Accidents in Portugal
2 503 267 447
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Accident with Casualties (Deaths and 
Injuries)
60 491
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Accident with Fatalities)
735 428
Annual Average Economic and Social 
Cost per Accident with Seriously Injured 
Victims)
121 429
Annual Average Economic and Social Cost 
per Accident with Slightly Injured Victims)
31 944
Our estimates are based on the records provided by ANSR, ECB PORDATA,  
PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, GNR, PSP and ITIj.
As seen above, the average economic and social cost per accident with ca-
sualties (again, including all types of victims), amounted to approximately 
60.5 thousand euros in the period considered.
When we take a look at the individual differences between fatalities, 
seriously and slightly injured victims with respect to accidents with ca-
sualties, we verify that the values  are disparate in relation to the cost per 
accident with victims, in particular, the average economic and social cost 
per accident with fatalities ascended to about 735.4 thousand euros in the 
period under review.
With regard to serious injuries, the average economic and social cost per 
accident was about 121.4 thousand euros.
As for minor injuries, the average economic and social cost per accident 
was about 31.9 thousand euros.
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8.2 – Specific findings
This study was aimed at estimating the economic and social cost of road 
accidents in Portugal for a period of fifteen years, having done so through 
the use of the ex-post Human Capital method.
We consider that the estimated costs of road accidents act as limitations 
upon society keeping it from reaping the gains that result from the reduc-
tion in road accidents and their direct and indirect consequences.
An estimated assessment of the economic and social cost of road accidents 
is necessary – although insufficient – for the enactment of policy measures 
in the road safety and mobility market so as to minimize these social costs 
within the limited resources available in society. What is at hand is not 
the total elimination of accident risk – for it an impossible task – but its 
minimization.
The greatest difficulty encountered in our study was the process of ob-
taining data from various sources which often led to delay and the non-
disclosure of certain data, chiefly, within the Ministry of Justice.
Despite the limitations on the availability of data referent to the various 
components that comprise road accident cost, the assessment of such costs 
was achieved through the use of previous studies, namely, the Portuguese 
Road Safety Association’s (PRP) 1987 Report and the study contained in 
Economic Analysis of Social Regulation, Causes, Consequences and Policies 
of Automotive Accidents – Donário (2007). The cost components for which 
data was unavailable are as follows:
– Court administrative costs;
– Attorney Fees;
– Court fees, and
– Funeral Expenses.
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Thus, the estimated costs of these components should be deemed as pre-
liminary and ought to be further investigated and researched using data 
recorded by the various competent institutions.
In effect, to better estimate the economic and social costs of accidents (both 
monetary and non-monetary) it is necessary that we have more viable 
information as well as other data that was not made available to us in this 
study. It is imperative that there be more coordination and organization 
regarding statistical records of all information pertaining to road accidents.
8.2.1 Evolution of the costs implied in the loss of potential pro-
duction of total accident victims
When we consider the value of lost potential production generated by each 
of the three categories of accident victims in the period between 1996 and 
2010, we obtain the overall value of potential production loss generated 
by the total number of casualties in the period under review.
The overall value of potential production loss with the total number of 
victims represents about 40% of the total value of the economic and social 
cost of road accidents in Portugal during the period covered by the time-
series (1996-2010).
The variance rate of the total number of accident victims throughout 
the period from 1998 until 2008 was always negative, except in 1998, 
2009 and 2010, having checked in with an accumulated variance rate of 
nearly - 36%. This indicates a positive trend in the sense of a fewer accident 
victims and lower social cost.
The variance rate of costs pertaining to the estimated lost production with 
of the total number of victims was always negative, having checked in with 
an accumulated rate of variance of - 97%.
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Since this rubric is an aggregate of the three components mentioned below, 
once again we verified that there is a high correlation between the two 
sets of variance rates thus indicating colinearity between them, whereby 
the reduction in the total number of accident victims tends to have a 
proportional effect on the cost reduction of lost production.
In 1996, the estimated value of lost production was about 1.522 billion 
euros (at constant prices of 2006) whereas by the end of that same period 
it was about 540 million euros, that is, nearly 2.82 times less than the value 
recorded at the beginning of the period. Over the fifteen years considered, 
the total value of estimated lost production with total number of accident 
victims was about 15.153 billion euros (see Appendix 6).
8.2.2 – Evolution of the costs implied in the loss of potential 
production of fatalities
Regarding the assessment of lost potential production with fatalities, 
we estimated the median age of such victims by taking into account the 
data provided by ANSR per age group and the average life expectancy in 
Portugal.
These costs are the bulk of the total value of lost production in each year of 
the time-series analyzed (1996-2010). The variance rate of the number of 
fatalities throughout the period was always negative, except in 2002, 2007 
and 2010, having registered an accumulated variance rate of about - 97%. 
This indicates a positive trend in the sense of fewer fatalities and lower 
social cost.
The variance rate of costs pertaining to the estimated lost production with 
fatal victims was negative, except in 1998, 2002 and 2007, having checked 
in with an accumulated rate of variance of 93%.
Similarity between the two sets of variance rates reveals high correlation 
between them, whereby the reduction in the number of road accident 
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fatalities tends to have a proportional effect on the cost reduction of lost 
production.
In 1996, the estimated value of lost production was about 1.055 billion 
euros (at constant prices of 2006) whereas by the end of that same period 
it was about 382 million euros, i.e., nearly 2.76 times less than the value 
recorded at the beginning of the period. Over the fifteen years considered, 
the total value of estimated lost production with road accident fatalities 
was about 11.088 billion euros (see Appendix 3).
8.2.3 – Evolution of the costs implied in the loss of potential 
production of seriously injured victims
Regarding the assessment of lost potential production with seriously 
injured victims, we estimated the median age of such victims by taking 
into account the data provided by ANSR per age group and the average 
life expectancy in Portugal.
These costs represent about one-fifth of the total value of lost production 
in each year of the time-series analyzed (1996-2010). The variance rate of 
the number of serious accident injuries throughout the period was always 
negative, except in 2009 and 2010, having registered an accumulated 
variance rate of about -132%. This indicates a positive trend in the sense 
of fewer seriously injured victims and lower social cost.
The variance rate of costs pertaining to the estimated lost production with 
seriously injured victims was negative, except in 2009 and 2010, having 
checked in with an accumulated rate of variance of about - 128%.
Similarity between the two sets of variance rates reveals high correlation 
between them, whereby the reduction in the number of seriously injured 
road accident victims tends to have a proportional effect on the cost 
reduction of lost production.
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In 1996, the estimated value of lost production was about 397 million euros 
(at constant prices of 2006) whereas by the end of that same period it was 
about 100 million euros, i.e., nearly 3.97 times less than the value recorded 
at the beginning of the period. Over the fifteen years considered, the total 
value of estimated lost production with seriously injured road accident 
victims was about 3.039 billion euros (see Appendix 4).
8.2.4 – Evolution of the costs implied in the loss of potential 
production of slightly injured victims
In assessing the loss of potential production with slightly injured victims, 
we estimated the median age of such victims by taking into account the 
data provided by ANSR per age group and the average life expectancy in 
Portugal, just as was done for other categories of victims.
These costs represent about 7% of the total value of lost production in 
each year of the time-series analyzed (1996-2010). The variance rate of 
the number of minor accident injuries throughout the period was negative 
from 1998 to 2008 (except from 1997 to 1998 and from 2009 to 2010), hav-
ing registered an accumulated variance rate of about - 23%. This indicates 
a positive trend in the sense of fewer slightly injured victims and lower 
social cost, albeit, this decrease was not as sharp as that seen in relation 
to fatalities and serious injury.
The variance rate of costs pertaining to the estimated lost production with 
slightly injured victims fluctuated although with a negative trend, having 
checked in with an accumulated rate of variance of about - 17%.
Again there is similarity between the two sets of variance rates, thus 
revealing high correlation between them, whereby the reduction in the 
number of slightly injured road accident victims tends to have a propor-
tional effect on the cost reduction of lost production.
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In 1996, the estimated value of lost production was about 70.5 million 
euros (at constant prices of 2006) whereas by the end of that same period 
it was about 58.7 million euros, that is, nearly 1.2 times less than the value 
recorded at the beginning of the period.
Over the fifteen years considered, the total value of estimated lost produc-
tion with slightly injured road accident victims was about 1.026 billion 
euros (see Appendix 5).
8.2.5 – Evolution of the economic and social cost of road accidents
The economic and social cost of road accidents in Portugal reflects the 
sum of several cost components in the period ranging from 1996 to 2010, 
which include the overall value of lost potential production of total victims, 
insurer administrative costs, road safety costs, court operating costs, 
hospital costs, victim transport costs, law enforcement costs, property 
damages to vehicles, loss adjustment costs, attorney fees, court costs, 
funeral expenses and non-monetary costs or moral damages to road crash 
victims (and their families).
The value of the economic and social cost of road accidents in Portugal rep-
resents about 1.64% of the Portuguese gross domestic product at constant 
prices of 2006, during the period covered by the time-series (1996-2010).
The variance rate of the total number of accidents with victims throughout 
the period was negative (except for 1997 and 2009) and the accumulated 
rate of variance was -32%, indicating a positive trend in the sense of fewer 
accident victims and lower social cost.
The variance rate of the economic and social cost of road accidents in 
Portugal in the period considered tended to be negative (except for 2001 
and 2009), having checked in with an accumulated rate of variance of 
about - 46%.
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Since this rubric is an aggregate of the various components aforementioned, 
we verified that there is a correlation between the two sets of variance 
rates thus indicating colinearity between them, whereby the reduction in 
the number of accidents with victims tends to have a proportional effect 
on the reduction of economic and social costs of road accidents.
In 1996, the estimated value of economic and social cost of road accidents 
was approximately 3.085 billion euros (at constant prices of 2006) whereas 
by the end of that same period it was about 1.890 billion euros, that is, 
nearly 1.63 times greater than the value recorded at the beginning of the 
period. Over the fifteen years considered, the total value of the average 
economic and social cost of road accidents in Portugal was nearly 37.549 
billion euros (see Appendix 8).
During this period, the accumulated total value of annual economic and 
social cost of road accidents in Portugal was about 37.549 billion, in which 
35% was attributable to fatal road accidents, 20% to serious injury road 
accidents and the remaining 45% to minor injury road accidents.
8.2.6 – Evolution of the average total cost per accident with 
victims
The value of the average cost per accident with victims is nearly 1.37 times 
greater than the average cost per victim, indicating that, on average, there 
is more than victim per crash during the period covered by the time-series 
(1996-2010).
The variance rate of the average cost per accident with victims in the 
period reviewed was almost always negative (except in 1999, 2000, 2001 
and 2008), having checked in with a cumulative rate of about - 14 %.
In 1996, the estimated average cost per accident with victims was about 
62.6 thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) whereas by the end of that 
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same period it was about 53.3 thousand euros, i.e., nearly 1.17 times greater 
than the value recorded at the beginning of the period (see Appendix 16).
8.2.7 – Evolution of the average cost per accident with fatalities
The value of the average cost per accident with fatalities is nearly 1.11 
times greater than the average cost per fatality, signifying that, on average, 
there is slightly more than one person killed per fatal car crash during the 
period covered by the time-series (1996-2010).
The variance rate of the average cost per accident with fatalities in the 
period under review was always positive – though with a downward 
slope – until 2002, year in which it began to fluctuate between positive 
and negative values, having checked in with a positive cumulative rate of 
about 4 % at the end of the period.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per accident with fatalities 
was about 655 thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) and by the end 
of that same period it was about 686.9 thousand euros, to be exact, nearly 
1.03 times greater than the value recorded at the beginning of the period 
(see Appendix 12).
8.2.8 – Evolution of the average cost per accident with seriously 
injured victims
The value of the average cost per accident with seriously injured victims 
is roughly 1.26 times greater than the average cost per seriously injured 
victim, meaning that, on average, there is more than one person seri-
ously injured in motor vehicle accidents of this category during the period 
covered by the time-series (1996-2010).
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The variance rate of the average cost per accident with seriously injured 
victims in the time frame considered was always positive until 2002, year 
in which it began to fluctuate between positive and negative values, having 
checked in with a positive cumulative rate of about 17 % at the end of the 
period.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per accident with seriously 
injured victims was about 107.5 thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) 
and by the end of that same period it was about 126 thousand euros, that is 
to say, nearly 1.17 times greater than the value recorded at the beginning 
of the period (see Appendix 13).
8.2.9 – Evolution of the average cost per accident with slightly 
injured victims
The value of the average cost per accident with slightly injured victims is 
about 1.38 times greater than the average cost per slightly injured victim, 
reflecting a higher toll in relation to the other categories of accident vic-
tims. This is consistent with observed reality since minor injuries represent, 
on average, about 88% of all road accident victims in period analyzed.
The variance rate of the average cost per accident with slightly injured 
victims in the period considered was always fluctuating between positive 
and negative values, except for 2001 (year in which the variance rate grew 
by about 46%) and in the years 2007 and 2008 in which it decreased by 
about 15% and grew by 12% respectively, having checked in with a positive 
cumulative rate of about 52 % at the end of the period.
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per accident with slightly 
injured victims was about 23.5 thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) 
and by the end of that same period it was about 35.5 thousand euros, 
that is, approximately 1.51 times greater than the value recorded at the 
beginning of the period (see Appendix 14).
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8.2.10 – Evolution of the average cost per victim
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per victim was about 44.9 
thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) and by the end of that same 
period it was about 40 thousand euros, id est, roughly 1.12 times less than 
the value recorded at the beginning of the period.
The variance rate of the average cost per victim in the period under review 
was almost always negative, except for the years 2000, 2001 (years in 
which the variance rate grew by about 4% and 17%, respectively) and in 
2008 year in which it grew by about 4%, having checked in with a negative 
cumulative rate of about 9% at the end of the period (see Appendix 15).
8.2.11 – Evolution of the average cost per fatality
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per fatality was about 
595.3 thousand euros (at constant prices of 2006) and by the end of that 
same period it was about 624.8 thousand euros, in other words, 1.05 times 
greater than the value recorded at the beginning of the period.
The variance rate of the average cost per fatality in the period under 
analysis was always positive until 2002, year in which it began to fluctuate 
between positive and negative values, having checked in with a positive 
cumulative rate of about 6% at the end of the period (See Appendix 9).
8.2.12 – Evolution of the average cost per seriously injured victim
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per seriously injured victim 
was about 85 thousand euros (at constant 2006 prices) and by the end of 
that same period it was about 101.7 thousand euros, i.e. nearly 1.2 times 
greater than the value recorded at the beginning of the period.
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The variance rate of the average cost per seriously injured victim during 
the period reviewed, was always positive until 2002, year in which it 
began to fluctuate between positive and negative values, having checked 
in with a positive cumulative rate of about 19% at the end of the period 
(See Appendix 10).
8.2.13 – Evolution of the average cost per slightly injured victim
At the beginning of the period, the average cost per slightly injured victim 
was about 16.4 thousand euros (at constant 2006 prices) and by the end of 
that same period it was about 26.4 thousand euros, that is, approximately 
1.61 times greater that the value recorded at the beginning of the period.
The variance rate of the average cost per slightly injured victim in the pe-
riod considered grew from 1997 to 2001, year in which it began to fluctuate 
between positive and negative values, having checked in with a positive 
cumulative rate of about 59% at the end of the period (See Appendix 11).
8.2.14 – Econometric Analysis Findings
Econometric models and covariance analysis showed that the increase in 
sanction severity, per se, in most cases, is not an effective policy in reducing 
road accidents and their effects – death and injury.
A legal sanction does not constitute in and by itself a behavioral incentive 
for drivers and other road users. For this we have the Expected Sanction 
– which is the product of the legal sanction weighed by its probability of 
enforcement and involves police action. The manner in which justice is 
administered, namely, judicial delay, is also important.
When it comes to road transport, the attitude of individuals towards risk 
has a great impact on their demeanor. Attitude towards risk can be divided 
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into risk-adversity, risk-seeking and risk-neutrality. Such attitude is taken 
into account for road safety policy purpose serving as a guideline when 
choosing on whether to increase sanctions or to increase the probability 
of enforcement.
Raising the severity of legal sanctions, per se, may have deterrent effects 
on risk-neutral and risk-averse individuals even if the probability of 
law enforcement is low. Such does not occur in relation to risk-seeking 
individuals because, to them, the increase in sanction severity with a low 
probability of law enforcement shall increase traffic law offenses and 
consequently increase the number of accidents – bearing in mind moral 
and ethical values.
Moreover, regardless of the severity of legal sanctions and the attitude 
towards risk, if the effective probability of law enforcement is less than 
threshold probability (considering the axiological standards as given) there 
will be a tendency to violate road traffic laws.
The econometric model results and the covariance analysis show evidence, 
that aside from the number of motorway kilometers – which has an impact 
on reducing the number of road accidents through the substitution effect 
and its consequences – policy measures that have increased the probability 
of law enforcement have been proven to be effective in reducing the 
effects of accidents. Example of these policies, are the reforms made to the 
Highway Code increasing fines, mandatory immediate payment of traffic 
offenses and the “Zero Tolerance” policy on certain stretches of roads.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the economic crisis that has 
affected the country in recent years (at least since 2007) is significant when 
it comes to explaining the positive evolution of fatalities and seriously 
injured victims (i.e., the reduction in the death and seriously injured toll). 
However, the econometric analysis performed eliminates this structural 
variable in reference to minor injury, apparently suggesting that the vari-
able “economic crisis” did not influence the evolution of minor accident 
injuries in Portugal in the period under review. In the case of total number 
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of victims, the variable Crisis also does not interfere in the evolution of 
accident victims when considered conjointly.
However, to fully capture the explanation of an event through models 
construed for that said purpose, it is necessary to bear in mind the indirect 
effects that a variable which may not directly appear to contribute to the 
demarcation of a certain event, but when considered in a composite man-
ner with another variable (or other variables) can increase the explanatory 
robustness of the model.
In this context, if we were to conjointly consider the variables 1) Crisis; 
2) immediate payment of traffic offenses and 3) “zero tolerance” policy, it 
appears that this Set of variables is significant and explains the evolution 
of the total number of victims as well as the different categories of road 
accident victims in Portugal.

IX 
Recommendation
Knowing that:
– Mobility is an intrinsic necessity of the individual which is mainly 
carried out by the means of road transport;
– Road transport allows for greater economic efficiency although it 
has a negative impact on the environment and on safety;
– Driver behavior can trigger social costs and benefits that affect 
not only themselves but other citizens;
– A driver seeks to minimize costs and maximize his utility therefore 
the cost borne by society tends to be, by and large, greater than 
the cost borne by the individual;
– Since the road safety and mobility market fail to attain efficiency, 
there is a need for government intervention;
– The enactment and adoption of policy measures requires knowl-
edge of the economic and social magnitude of road accidents;
– A good proxy for this magnitude is the economic and social cost 
of road accidents;
– This cost can be monetary and non-monetary or moral;
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– Monetary costs are categorized as Direct and Indirect;
– Direct monetary costs of road accidents include property damages 
to vehicles and other public and private property; hospital-related 
costs with victims; time spent on hospital visits; transport of 
victims; loss adjustment costs; direct intervention of law enforce-
ment; funeral expenses of victims etc…;
– Indirect monetary costs of road accidents includes the value of 
lost potential production of fatalities and injured victims; insurer 
administrative costs; court fees; road safety or deterrence costs; 
attorney fees; court operating costs, cost of accident risk;
– There are costs associated with negative externalities that affect 
the environment and should be considered when assessing the 
economic and social cost of road accidents;
– In pursuance of this study some difficult was encountered during 
the process of gathering data from various sources which often led 
to delay and the non-disclosure of certain data, mainly, within the 
Ministry of justice.
We recommend:
– The formation of a permanent inter-ministerial body that will 
incorporate the existing support structure for mid-term review 
of the National Road Safety Strategy, supported by the ANSR, 
to coordinate, organize, obtain and provide – on a regular 
basis – the necessary data for the assessment of the economic 
and social cost of road accidents in Portugal.
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Appendix 1
Year
Number of 
Accidents 
with Victims
Variance 
Rate of 
Accidents 
with Victims
Number of 
Accidents 
with  
Fatalities
Number of 
Accidents 
with Fatalities 
and/or Injured 
Victims
Number of 
Accidents 
with Seri­
ously Injured 
Victims
Number of 
Accidents 
with Slightly 
Injured 
Victims
Number of 
Accidents 
with Total 
Injured
1996 49 265 0.019 1 880 10 456 8 576 38 809 47 385
1997 49 417 0.003 1 732 9 178 7 446 40 239 47 685
1998 49 319 -0.002 1 647 8 176 6 529 41 143 47 672
1999 47 966 -0.027 1 582 7 652 6 070 40 314 46 384
2000 44 159 -0.079 1 450 6 898 5 448 37 261 42 709
2001 42 521 -0.037 1 316 5 814 4 498 36 707 41 205
2002 42 219 -0.007 1 323 4 966 3 643 37 253 40 896
2003 41 495 -0.017 1 222 4 894 3 672 36 601 40 273
2004 38 930 -0.062 1 024 4 314 3 290 34 616 37 906
2005 37 066 -0.048 988 4 001 3 013 33 065 36 078
2006 35680 -0.037 786 3 551 2 765 32 129 34 894
2007 35311 -0.010 765 3 224 2 459 32 087 34 546
2008 33613 -0.048 721 2 829 2 108 30 784 32 892
2009 35484 0.056 673 2 777 2 104 32 707 34 811
2010 35426 -0.002 674 2 802 2 128 32 624 34 752
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR.
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Appendix 2
Year
Number of 
Fatalities
Influence 
of Fatali­
ties on the 
Total 
Injured 
Victim Toll
Number of 
Seriously 
Injured 
Victims
Influence 
of Seriously 
Injured 
Victims on 
the Total 
Injured 
Victim Toll
Number 
of Slightly 
Injured 
Victims
Influence 
of Slightly 
Injured 
Victims on 
the Total 
Injured 
Victim Toll
Total 
Number 
of Injured 
Victims
Total 
Number of 
Accident 
Victims
1996 2 100 0.031 10 842 0.158 55 785 0.812 66 627 68 727
1997 1 939 0.028 9 335 0.136 57 181 0.835 66 516 68 455
1998 1 865 0.027 8 177 0.119 58 426 0.853 66 603 68 468
1999 1 750 0.026 7 697 0.115 57 630 0.859 65 327 67 077
2000 1 629 0.026 6 918 0.112 53 006 0.861 59 924 61 553
2001 1 466 0.025 5 797 0.099 51 247 0.876 57 044 58 510
2002 1 469 0.025 4 770 0.082 51 815 0.893 56 585 58 054
2003 1 356 0.024 4 659 0.082 50 599 0.894 55 258 56 614
2004 1 135 0.021 4 190 0.079 47 819 0.900 52 009 53 144
2005 1 094 0.022 3 762 0.075 45 487 0.904 49 249 50 343
2006 850 0.018 3 483 0.073 43 654 0.910 47137 47 987
2007 854 0.018 3 116 0.066 43 202 0.916 46318 47 172
2008 776 0.017 2 606 0.058 41 327 0.924 43933 44 709
2009 737 0.016 2624 0.056 43790 0.929 46414 47 151
2010 741 0.016 2 637 0.056 43 924 0.929 46561 47 302
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR.
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Appendix 3
Year
Value of Lost 
Production of 
Fatalities  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses 
and Gains of the 
Value of Lost 
Production of 
Fatalities (in Euros)
Variance Rate of 
the Value of Lost 
Production of 
Fatalities
Trend in the Lost 
Production of 
Fatalities  
in % of GDP
Relative Losses 
and Gains of Lost 
Production of 
Fatalities  
in % of GDP
1996 1 054 911 249 NA NA 0.0082 NA
1997 1 035 271 775 -19 639 475 -0.019 0.0078 -0.0005
1998 1 056 770 424 21 498 650 0.021 0.0075 -0.0002
1999 1 016 118 775 -40 651 650 -0.038 0.0070 -0.0006
2000 956 333 379 -59 785 396 -0.059 0.0063 -0.0007
2001 871 009 651 -85 323 727 -0.089 0.0056 -0.0007
2002 872 363 727 1 354 076 0.002 0.0056 0.0000
2003 777 798 439 -94 565 288 -0.108 0.0050 -0.0006
2004 669 829 831 -107 968 608 -0.139 0.0043 -0.0008
2005 632 971 243 -36 858 588 -0.055 0.0040 -0.0003
2006 461 224 479 -171 746 764 -0.271 0.0029 -0.0011
2007 483 982 133 22 757 654 0.049 0.0029 0.0001
2008 424 937 740 -59 044 393 -0.122 0.0026 -0.0003
2009 393 040 186 -31 897 554 -0.075 0.0024 -0.0001
2010 381 835 255 -11 204 931 -0.029 0.0024 -0.0001
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ACSS, ECB and PORDATA.
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Appendix 4
Year
Value of Lost  
Production of  
Seriously Injured 
Victims (in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Value 
of Lost Production 
of Seriously Injured 
Victims (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Value of Lost  
Production of  
Seriously Injured 
Victims
Trend in the Lost 
Production of  
Seriously Injured 
Victims in % of GDP
1996 396 617 564 NA NA 0.003
1997 346 458 073 -50 159 491 -0.126 0.003
1998 310 076 712 -36 381 361 -0.105 0.002
1999 295 392 026 -14 684 686 -0.047 0.002
2000 270 059 149 -25 332 876 -0.086 0.002
2001 226 969 062 -43 090 088 -0.160 0.001
2002 185 385 189 -41 583 873 -0.183 0.001
2003 169 045 856 -16 339 333 -0.088 0.001
2004 155 970 935 -13 074 920 -0.077 0.001
2005 137 608 336 -18 362 599 -0.118 0.001
2006 130 472 627 -7 135 709 -0.052 0.001
2007 119 165 718 -11 306 909 -0.087 0.001
2008 96 321 307 -22 844 412 -0.192 0.001
2009 99 184 638 2 863 331 0.030 0.001
2010 99 896 190 711 552 0.007 0.001
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ACSS, ECB and PORDATA.
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Appendix 5
Year
Value of Lost  
Production of Slightly 
Injured Victims  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Value 
of Lost Production 
of Slightly Injured 
Victims (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Value of Lost  
Production of Slightly 
Injured Victims
Trend in the Lost 
Production of Slightly 
Injured Victims  
in % of GDP
1996 70 517 643 NA NA 0.0006
1997 75 049 605 4 531 962 0.064 0.0006
1998 80 093 379 5 043 774 0.067 0.0006
1999 80 059 696 -33 683 0.000 0.0005
2000 79 617 731 -441 965 -0.006 0.0005
2001 73 329 631 -6 288 099 -0.079 0.0005
2002 73 607 955 278 323 0.004 0.0005
2003 70 280 695 -3 327 260 -0.045 0.0005
2004 66 535 532 -3 745 163 -0.053 0.0004
2005 62 803 299 -3 732 233 -0.056 0.0004
2006 60 286 102 -2 517 197 -0.040 0.0004
2007 59 990 110 -295 992 -0.005 0.0004
2008 56 923 725 -3 066 385 -0.051 0.0003
2009 58 288 946 1 365 221 0.024 0.0004
2010 58 735 243 446 297 0.008 0.0004
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ACSS, ECB and PORDATA.
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Appendix 6
Year
Total Value of Lost 
Production (Fatalities 
and Injured Victims) – 
in Euros
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Value 
of Lost Production 
(Fatalities and Injured 
Victims) – in Euros
Variance Rate of the 
Value of Lost  
Production (Fatalities 
and Injured Victims)
Trend in the Lost 
Production (Fatalities 
and Injured Victims)  
in % of GDP
1996 1 522 046 456 NA NA 0.012
1997 1 456 779 453 -65 267 003 -0.043 0.011
1998 1 446 940 515 -9 838 938 -0.007 0.010
1999 1 391 570 497 -55 370 019 -0.038 0.010
2000 1 306 010 259 -85 560 238 -0.061 0.009
2001 1 171 308 345 -134 701 914 -0.103 0.008
2002 1 131 356 871 -39 951 474 -0.034 0.007
2003 1 017 124 990 -114 231 881 -0.101 0.007
2004 892 336 298 -124 788 692 -0.123 0.006
2005 833 382 878 -58 953 420 -0.066 0.005
2006 651 983 208 -181 399 670 -0.218 0.004
2007 663 137 961 11 154 752 0.017 0.004
2008 578 182 771 -84 955 190 -0.128 0.004
2009 550 513 770 -27 669 001 -0.048 0.003
2010 540 466 689 -10 047 081 -0.018 0.003
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ACSS, BCE and PORDATA.
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Appendix 7 – A
Year
Administrative 
Costs of  
Insurers  
(in Euros)
Road Safety 
Costs  
(in Euros)
Court 
Operating 
Costs  
(in Euros)
Hospital Costs 
with Fatalities 
and Seriously 
Injured Victims 
(in Euros)
Ambulance 
Fees and 
Transport 
Costs of 
Fatalities  
(in Euros)
Ambulance 
Fees and 
Transport 
Costs of 
Total Injured 
(in Euros)
Total Costs 
with Law 
Enforcement 
(in Euros)
1996 176 326 589 46 481 993 877 525 50 854 318 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 625 429
1997 176 326 589 46 436 150 874 052 50 854 318 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 625 429
1998 176 326 589 46 438 341 874 218 50 854 318 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 625 429
1999 176 326 589 46 203 903 856 457 50 854 318 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 625 429
2000 176 326 589 45 272 891 785 925 50 854 318 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 625 429
2001 182 012 906 44 760 025 747 071 47 765 034 2 004 614 2 004 614 90 888 651
2002 151 781 754 44 683 171 741 249 47 164 702 2 004 614 2 004 614 89 018 041
2003 215 887 976 44 440 475 722 863 42 549 078 2 004 614 2 004 614 88 089 126
2004 201 456 750 43 855 643 678 557 38 979 387 2 004 614 2 004 614 92 209 330
2005 206 368 692 43 383 564 642 793 34 680 537 1 554 880 1 554 880 92 580 414
2006 208 378 205 42 986 485 612 711 33 906 206 1 318 659 1 318 659 94 824 465
2007 217 835 513 42 849 125 602 305 31 576 589 1 387 411 1 387 411 93 912 216
2008 175 932 761 42 434 012 570 857 27 261 606 1 624 810 1 624 810 91 257 889
2009 187 768 155 40 455 985 602 037 27 331 977 1 578 490 1 578 490 87 193 493
2010 187 768 155 31 033 356 603 965 27 331 977 1 578 490 1 578 490 97 160 399
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
149Appendix
Appendix 7 – B
Year
Costs with 
property 
damage to 
vehicles  
(in Euros)
Accident 
Loss 
Adjust­
ment 
Costs  
(in Euros)
Attorney 
Fees  
(in Euros)
Court 
Fees  
(in Euros)
Funeral 
Expenses 
(in Euros)
Non­
Monetary 
Damages of 
Fatalities  
(in Euros)
Non­
Monetary 
Damages 
of Seriously 
Injured 
Victims  
(in Euros)
Social and 
Economic Cost 
of Automotive 
Accidents in 
Portugal  
(in Euros)
1996 714 632 915 8 825 506 5 977 899 3 510 073 1 361 520 150 303 232 309 714 382 3 085 547 064
1997 714 632 915 8 790 577 5 954 240 3 496 181 1 257 137 138 779 984 266 665 168 2 965 481 422
1998 714 632 915 8 792 247 5 955 371 3 496 845 1 209 159 133 483 584 233 585 547 2 917 224 307
1999 714 632 915 8 613 623 5 834 381 3 425 803 1 134 600 125 252 693 219 873 787 2 839 214 223
2000 714 632 915 7 904 264 5 353 902 3 143 678 1 056 150 116 592 364 197 620 743 2 720 188 654
2001 1 188 190 501 7 513 500 5 089 221 2 988 263 950 471 104 925 970 165 598 070 3 016 747 258
2002 1 183 943 641 7 454 944 5 049 558 2 964 974 952 416 105 140 689 136 260 616 2 910 521 855
2003 1 010 861 405 7 270 028 4 924 306 2 891 430 879 153 97 052 944 133 089 772 2 669 792 773
2004 964 971 812 6 824 431 4 622 484 2 714 207 735 869 81 235 318 119 692 239 2 454 321 555
2005 895 928 210 6 464 744 4 378 852 2 571 153 709 287 77 513 524 106 637 501 2 308 351 907
2006 896 263 866 6 162 200 4 173 926 2 450 825 551 091 59 906 574 98 524 710 2 103 361 790
2007 684 823 975 6 057 543 4 103 037 2 409 201 553 685 60 765 449 88 840 779 1 900 242 202
2008 808 806 110 5 741 259 3 888 805 2 283 409 503 114 55 325 904 74 329 166 1 869 767 284
2009 861 039 570 6 054 846 4 101 211 2 408 129 477 829 52 534 558 74 786 225 1 898 424 764
2010 861 039 570 6 074 237 4 114 345 2 415 841 480 422 52 963 996 75 214 717 1 889 824 649
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 8
Year
Social and Economic 
Cost of Automotive 
Accidents in Portugal 
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost of Automotive 
Accidents in Portugal 
(in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost of 
Automotive Accidents 
in Portugal
Total Social and 
Economic Cost of 
Accidents with Victims 
in Relation to GDP
1996 3 085 547 064 NA NA 2.41%
1997 2 965 481 422 -120 065 642 -0.039 2.22%
1998 2 917 224 307 -48 257 115 -0.016 2.08%
1999 2 839 214 223 -78 010 084 -0.027 1.94%
2000 2 720 188 654 -119 025 568 -0.042 1.79%
2001 3 016 747 258 296 558 604 0.109 1.95%
2002 2 910 521 855 -106 225 403 -0.035 1.87%
2003 2 669 792 773 -240 729 083 -0.083 1.73%
2004 2 454 321 555 -215 471 218 -0.081 1.57%
2005 2 308 351 907 -145 969 648 -0.059 1.46%
2006 2 103 361 790 -204 990 117 -0.089 1.31%
2007 1 900 242 202 -203 119 588 -0.097 1.15%
2008 1 869 767 284 -30 474 918 -0.016 1.14%
2009 1 898 424 764 28 657 480 0.015 1.18%
2010 1 889 824 649 -8 600 115 -0.005 1.17%
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 9
Year
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Fatality  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Fatality (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Fatality
1996 595 332 NA NA
1997 627 748 32 416 0.054
1998 661 165 33 417 0.053
1999 675 911 14 746 0.022
2000 684 367 8 456 0.013
2001 701 386 17 019 0.025
2002 701 837 452 0.001
2003 679 929 -21 909 -0.031
2004 697 608 17 680 0.026
2005 684 938 -12 671 -0.018
2006 650 810 -34 127 -0.050
2007 672 060 21 249 0.033
2008 656 837 -15 222 -0.023
2009 642 696 -14 141 -0.022
2010 624 766 -17 930 -0.028
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 10
Year
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Seriously 
Injured Victim  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Seriously Injured 
Victim (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Seriously 
Injured Victim
1996 84 995 NA NA
1997 86 283 1 287 0.015
1998 87 752 1 470 0.017
1999 88 879 1 127 0.013
2000 91 484 2 604 0.029
2001 101 411 9 927 0.109
2002 101 869 459 0.005
2003 97 518 -4 352 -0.043
2004 99 292 1 774 0.018
2005 98 386 -905 -0.009
2006 101 290 2 904 0.030
2007 98 693 -2 597 -0.026
2008 100 719 2 026 0.021
2009 101 661 942 0.009
2010 101 653 -8 -0.0001
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 11
Year
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Slightly 
Injured Victim  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Slightly Injured Victim 
(in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Slightly 
Injured Victim
1996 16 381 NA NA
1997 16 489 107 0.007
1998 16 544 56 0.003
1999 16 871 327 0.020
2000 18 346 1 476 0.087
2001 27 331 8 985 0.490
2002 26 896 -435 -0.016
2003 25 563 -1 333 -0.050
2004 26 067 504 0.020
2005 26 137 70 0.003
2006 27 429 1 292 0.049
2007 23 582 -3 847 -0.140
2008 26 559 2 977 0.126
2009 26 444 -114 -0.004
2010 26 382 -62 -0.002
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 12
Year
Average number of 
Fatalities per Accident 
with Fatalities
Average Social and 
Economic Cost per  
Accident with  
Fatalities  
(in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with  
Fatalities (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Accident with 
Fatalities
1996 1.12 664 999 NA NA
1997 1.12 702 773 37 775 0.057
1998 1.13 748 678 45 904 0.065
1999 1.11 747 689 -988 -0.001
2000 1.12 768 851 21 161 0.028
2001 1.11 781 331 12 480 0.016
2002 1.11 779 289 -2 042 -0.003
2003 1.11 754 487 -24 802 -0.032
2004 1.11 773 228 18 741 0.025
2005 1.11 758 423 -14 805 -0.019
2006 1.08 703 803 -54 620 -0.072
2007 1.12 750 247 46 444 0.066
2008 1.08 706 943 -43 304 -0.058
2009 1.10 703 815 -3 128 -0.004
2010 1.10 686 872 -16 942 -0.024
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 13
Year
Average number of 
Seriously Injured 
Victims per Accident 
with Serious Injury
Average Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Serious 
Injury (in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Serious 
Injury (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Accident with 
Serious Injury
1996 1.26 107 453 NA NA
1997 1.25 108 172 719 0.007
1998 1.25 109 902 1 730 0.016
1999 1.27 112 703 2 800 0.025
2000 1.27 116 168 3 466 0.031
2001 1.29 130 698 14 529 0.125
2002 1.31 133 384 2 686 0.021
2003 1.27 123 729 -9 654 -0.072
2004 1.27 126 454 2 724 0.022
2005 1.25 122 844 -3 609 -0.029
2006 1.26 127 593 4 749 0.039
2007 1.27 125 062 -2 531 -0.020
2008 1.24 124 514 -549 -0.004
2009 1.25 126 786 2 273 0.018
2010 1.24 125 968 -818 -0.006
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 14
Year
Average number 
of Slightly Injured 
Victims per Accident 
with Minor Injury
Average Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Minor 
Injury (in Euros)
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Minor 
Injury (in Euros)
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Accident with 
Minor Injury
1996 1.44 23 547 NA NA
1997 1.42 23 431 -116 -0.005
1998 1.42 23 494 63 0.003
1999 1.43 24 117 624 0.027
2000 1.42 26 099 1 982 0.082
2001 1.40 38 157 12 058 0.462
2002 1.39 37 409 -748 -0.020
2003 1.38 35 340 -2 069 -0.055
2004 1.38 36 009 670 0.019
2005 1.38 35 956 -53 -0.001
2006 1.36 37 268 1 311 0.036
2007 1.35 31 750 -5 517 -0.148
2008 1.34 35 654 3 904 0.123
2009 1.34 35 405 -249 -0.007
2010 1.35 35 520 115 0.003
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 15
Year
Average Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Victim (Fatalities and 
Injured) – in Euros
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Victim (Fatalities and 
Injured)­ in Euros
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Victim  
(Fatalities and Injured)
1996 44 896 NA NA
1997 43 320 -1 576 -0.035
1998 42 607 -713 -0.016
1999 42 328 -279 -0.007
2000 44 193 1 865 0.044
2001 51 560 7 367 0.167
2002 50 135 -1 425 -0.028
2003 47 158 -2 977 -0.059
2004 46 182 -975 -0.021
2005 45 852 -330 -0.007
2006 43 832 -2 021 -0.044
2007 40 283 -3 549 -0.081
2008 41 821 1 538 0.038
2009 40 263 -1 558 -0.037
2010 39 952 -310 -0.008
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
The Economic and Social Cost of Road Accidents in Portugal158
Appendix 16
Year
Average Number of 
Victims (Fatalities and 
Injured) per Accident 
with Victims
Average Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Victims 
(Fatalities and Injured) 
– in Euros
Absolute Losses and 
Gains of the Average 
Value of Social and 
Economic Cost per 
Accident with Victims 
(Fatalities and Injured) 
– in Euros
Variance Rate of the 
Average Value of 
Social and Economic 
Cost per Accidents 
with Victims  
(Fatalities and Injured)
1996 1.40 62 632 NA NA
1997 1.39 60 009 -2 622 -0.042
1998 1.39 59 150 -859 -0.014
1999 1.40 59 192 42 0.001
2000 1.39 61 600 2 408 0.041
2001 1.38 70 947 9 347 0.152
2002 1.38 68 939 -2 009 -0.028
2003 1.36 64 340 -4 599 -0.067
2004 1.37 63 044 -1 296 -0.020
2005 1.36 62 277 -768 -0.012
2006 1.34 58 951 -3 326 -0.053
2007 1.34 53 814 -5 136 -0.087
2008 1.33 55 626 1 812 0.034
2009 1.33 53 501 -2 125 -0.038
2010 1.34 53 346 -155 -0.003
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR, ECB, PORDATA, PRP, ISP, ACSS, INEM, 
GNR, PSP and ITIj.
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Appendix 17
Year
Average Annual 
Social Cost of Road 
Accidents with Fatal 
Victims (In Euros)
Annual Weight of 
Social Cost of Road 
Accidents with Fatal 
Victims
1996 1 250 197 239 41%
1997 1 217 203 441 41%
1998 1 233 072 090 42%
1999 1 182 844 325 42%
2000 1 114 833 343 41%
2001 1 028 231 232 34%
2002 1 030 999 221 35%
2003 921 983 307 35%
2004 791 785 522 32%
2005 749 321 662 32%
2006 553 188 798 26%
2007 573 938 956 30%
2008 509 705 841 27%
2009 473 667 213 25%
2010 462 951 908 24%
Value of the Period 1996­2010 13 093 924 098 35%
Annual Average 872 928 273 35%
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR.
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Appendix 18
Year
Average Annual  
Social Cost of Road  
Accidents with  
Seriously Injured 
Victims (In Euros)
Annual Weight of 
Social Cost of Road 
Accidents with  
Seriously Injured 
Victims
1996 921 518 835 30%
1997 805 448 157 27%
1998 717 551 494 25%
1999 684 104 314 24%
2000 632 885 172 23%
2001 587 877 957 19%
2002 485 916 347 17%
2003 454 334 263 17%
2004 416 032 370 17%
2005 370 129 330 16%
2006 352 794 520 17%
2007 307 528 248 16%
2008 262 474 940 14%
2009 266 758 689 14%
2010 268 060 232 14%
Value of the Period 1996­2010 7 533 414 867 20%
Annual Average 502 227 658 20%
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR.
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Appendix 19
Year
Average Annual 
Social Cost of Road 
Accidents with Slightly 
Injured Victims  
(In Euros)
Annual Weight of 
Social Cost of Road 
Accidents with Slightly 
Injured Victims
1996 913 830 989 30%
1997 942 829 823 32%
1998 966 600 723 33%
1999 972 265 583 34%
2000 972 470 139 36%
2001 1 400 638 069 46%
2002 1 393 606 287 48%
2003 1 293 475 203 48%
2004 1 246 503 663 51%
2005 1 188 900 916 52%
2006 1 197 378 473 57%
2007 1 018 774 998 54%
2008 1 097 586 503 59%
2009 1 157 998 863 61%
2010 1 158 812 509 61%
Value of the Period 1996­2010 16 921 672 742 45%
Annual Average 1 128 111 516 45%
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from ANSR.
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Appendix 20
Year
Portuguese GDP at 
constant prices of 
2006 in Euros
Portuguese GDP per 
capita at constant 
prices of 2006 in Euros
Portuguese Population
1996 127 964 841 100 12 723 10 057 836
1997 133 573 304 200 13 237 10 091 133
1998 140 318 361 100 13 853 10 129 315
1999 146 039 009 900 14 357 10 171 973
2000 151 773 012 300 14 842 10 225 845
2001 154 758 286 100 15 035 10 292 996
2002 155 857 518 300 15 032 10 368 382
2003 154 406 195 000 14 788 10 441 105
2004 156 811 857 100 14 932 10 501 943
2005 157 998 642 300 14 977 10 549 419
2006 160 273 457 000 15 143 10 584 346
2007 164 663 844 800 15 522 10 608 348
2008 164 090 143 900 15 448 10 622 440
2009 160 577 505 000 15 103 10 632 512
2010 162 032 546 100 15 232 10 637 300
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from Pordata.
